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After eight years of teaching a three-credit course on The Legal
Profession and Professional Responsibility to second- and third-year law
students, I am left with a sense of great dissatisfaction with the whole
enterprise. So deep is my dissatisfaction that I am questioning whether to
continue or move into a different course instead. This paper is an
opportunity to take stock of my experience and attempt to map out the
causes of my dissatisfaction, and to seek some vision, if possible, of what
the course should be about, how to teach it, and why I should bother. To
give the conclusion away, I have in this process arrived at the point of
renewed hope, even though many problems remain unresolved and many
ideals remain to be actualized. The professional responsibility course may
be the most problematic one I teach, but I also think it is the most
important, and perhaps one day will even be the most personally
fulfilling.
II. What Should We Teach?: Three Approaches to Professional
Responsibility
By asking the question, "What should we teach?" I do not intend to deal
with a list of specific topics, like a syllabus for some course. Rather, my
intention is to point out that various basic approaches to the subject as a
whole may be adopted and I wish to briefly describe three of these
approaches and make some evaluative comments on them. These three
approaches might be called the "social role morality" model, the
"lawyer's law" model, and the "personal moral reasoning in relational
context" model. My thesis is that while no single model should be
exclusively adopted as the basis for teaching professional responsibility,
we should develop the "personal moral reasoning" approach, which I
view as more promising than the other approaches. My teaching of
professional responsibility has been unsatisfactory partly because it has
*Professor of Law, University of Manitoba. I want to thank Harold Dick, a law student at the
University of Manitoba, who aided in the research of this paper.
**Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Legal Education Conference sponsored
by the Federation of Law Societies, Oct. 1985, and to the Canadian Association of Law
Teachers Conference, May 1, 1986.
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not moved much beyond the first two models of role morality and
legalism.
1. Social Role Morality
One of the most influential American conferences on the topic of legal
education and the professional responsibility of lawyers took place at the
University of Colorado in Boulder in 1956. It was sponsored by the
Committee on Education for Professional Responsibility of the
Association of American Law Schools. Professor Julius Stone wrote a
remarkably wide-ranging book based on the conference debates,1 and
even though two other national conferences have subsequently been held
- at Boulder again in 1968,2 and in Detroit in 19773 - the issues and
ideas generated at the 1956 conference have proven to be some of the
most original and durable in the field. At the 1956 conference various
foundational models of how to formulate and justify professional norms
were posited, but no one model gained acceptance from all participants.
This lack of agreement as to the ethical foundations for professional
responsibility is undoubtedly as real today, if not more so, as it was in
1956.
One of the most popular models presented to the conference, however,
largely attributed to Professor Lon Fuller of Harvard,4 was the view that
the wellspring of a lawyer's duties to clients and to the public flow from
the legal profession's unique role in society as the trustee for the forms of
social order. The forms of social order include not only legislative,
judicial, and administrative forms, but also the process of private ordering
through contract, and the negotiation and drafting of the constitutions of
private organizations. Thus what the lawyer does in the privacy of the
office may be seen as part of the public administration of justice, because
law is made and applied through lawyer counselling and planning, and
often this "private" law has public impacts as great as any ruling of a high
court in a litigation matter.5 To keep all the forms of social order working
fairly and with integrity is the obligation of the profession, and each
lawyer must place that obligation above any particular client interest
1. J. Stone, Legal Education and Public Responsibility, (A.A.L.S., 1959).
2. The 1968 conference papers and proceedings are found in D.T. Weckstein, ed., Education
in the Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer, (University Press of Virginia, 1970).
3. The 1977 conference papers and proceedings are found in P.A. Keenan, ed., Teaching
ProfessionalResponsibility, (U. of Detroit Press, 1979).
4. See Stone, supra, note 1 at Chapter II, "Core Values in the Lawyers' Trust" for summary
of Fullers position.
5. On the importance of the law office as part of the administration of justice, see also L. M.
Brown and E. A. Dauer, Planning By Lawyers: Materials on a Nonadversarial Legal Process,
(The Foundation Press, 1978) and the autobiography by Louis M. Brown, Lawyering Through
Life: The Origin of Preventive Law, (Rothman & Co., 1986).
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contrary to it. Loyalty to the fair process of law is primary and constrains
lawyer behaviour on behalf of clients. Thus Professor Fuller thought that
"the trusteeship of the forms of social order" model would place real
moral constraints on lawyer conduct whether in the role of advocate,
counsellor, lobbyist, negotiator, or whatever. In essence the social role of
the legal profession was seen as the normative base to formulate the more
particular obligations of the lawyer. Fuller stated:
6
A true sense of professional responsibility must derive from an
understanding of the reasons that lie back of specific restraints, such as
those embodied in the Canons. The grounds for the lawyer's peculiar
obligations are to be found in the nature of his calling. The lawyer who
seeks a clear understanding of his duties will be led to reflect on the special
services his profession renders to society and the services it might render
if its full capacities were realized. When the lawyer fully understands the
nature of his office, he will then discern what restraints are necessary to
keep that office wholesome and effective.
Professor Fuller, a few years later in 1958, as Chairman of the Joint
Conference on Professional Responsibility of the A.B.A. and A.A.L.S.,
drafted a statement on professional responsibility7 that had a considerable
impact on the development of the A.B.A. Model Code of 1969 and the
systematic justification arguments of professional morality generally. The
statement included a spirited defence of the adversary system and zealous
advocacy, but also called for constraints on the lawyer's advocacy so as
to uphold the dignity and integrity of the system. Interestingly, however,
in the counselling role, where no impartial tribunal was supervising the
decision, Fuller suggested:8
Although the lawyer serves the administration of justice indispensably
both as advocate and as office counsellor, the demands imposed on him by
these two roles must be sharply distinguished. The man who has been
called into court to answer for his own actions is entitled to a fair hearing.
Partisan advocacy plays its essential part in such a hearing, and the lawyer
pleading his client's case may properly present it in the most favorable
light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes
inappropriate when the lawyer acts as counsellor. The reasons that justify
and even require partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do not grant any
license to the lawyer to participate as legal adviser in a line of conduct that
is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality. In saving himself from this
unworthy involvement, the lawyer cannot be guided solely by an
unreflective inner sense of good faith; he must be at pains to preserve a
sufficient detachment from his client's interests so that he remains capable
6. Supra note 1 at 54-55.
7. ProfessionalResponsibiity: Report of the Joint Conference (1958), 44 A.B.A.J. 1159-1162,
1216-1218.
8. Idat 1161.
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of a sound and objective appraisal of the propriety of what his client
proposes to do.
Additional elaboration on the lawyer's responsibility to the public, and
not just to the client, in designing the frameworks for collaborative
efforts, and the various responsibilities of public service by lawyers was
included in the joint conference statement.
Thus one approach to the normative content and scope of professional
responsibility, of which Fuller's model is a good example, could be called
the social role morality model. I use the term "social role" initially, rather
than "professional role," because the individual professional role is seen
as first of all rooted in the more fundamental social role of the profession
collectively. The social role of the profession gives shape to the
institutions, processes and general conventions of the profession and then
these in turn shape the various role demands made on the individual
professional in the legal system. It might be asked, of course, whether
social needs and norms have really determined the shape of the legal
institutions and the professional roles within them, or whether instead the
institutions themselves have evolved haphazardly and have been shaped
more by the professionals themselves than by reference to social needs.
What are some of the implications of such a model for the teaching of
professional responsibility? It seems to me that some positive points can
be made, but that essentially the model of "professionalism" does not
serve as an adequate answer to the problem of goodness in lawyering. To
say that this approach is problematic is not to suggest that the teaching of
professional responsibility should ignore it. It seems to me to be the
dominant conventional way that lawyers justify what they do. When
dealing with professional activity that seems at first blush to violate
ordinary moral norms, lawyers will point out some allegedly more
important collective social good that can only be fulfilled by having
lawyers act this way. The irony is that lawyers appeal to the collective
social interest for justification for the almost absolute fidelity to individual
interests that often harm the collective interest. But even if we disagree
with the conventional role justifications, we cannot deny that being in a
professional role carries with it structural expectations of behaviour that
may not exist outside the role. These expectations that people have of
how we should act as lawyers by necessity become factors to consider in
moral reasoning. Thus, students must confront the social role morality
model.
Positively, one of the implications of this approach, if taught critically,
is the wide scope of the inquiry. An examination of legal institutions, the
history and sociological characteristics of the profession, the modes of
delivery of legal services, and even what the just ordering of society
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entails procedurally and substantively could be included. Any focus on
the many particular ethical dilemmas involving the lawyer-client
relationship should be placed first within the context of a much broader
examination of the changing social context and the social role of the
profession within it. The focus cannot be only on particular situations
that raise ethical concerns, but also on the systems of the law. Personal
integrity alone is not enough if the institutions and processes of the law
systemically lack integrity in the first place. The focus cannot be only on
the duty of the lawyer, but also must include the duty of the profession
collectively.
A second positive implication is that professional norms and practices
must be judged not by what the profession wants, but by a "consumer
perspective," as it were. As ethical dilemmas or the legal profession's
governance and performance are examined, the students must put
themselves into the shoes of the layperson and consider what behaviour
would best serve and protect consumers of legal services and the public
generally. What qualities of behaviour and what activities do we as a
society want from lawyers? Are lawyers fulfilling these expectations?
A third positive implication is that focusing on roles should lead to the
understanding that lawyers are involved in many different roles in many
different contexts. It is thus inappropriate to paint one picture of the
ethical duty of lawyers and impose it on every situation without full
attention to the very different factors that exist as you move between
roles.
Positively we can say, finally, that the idea of finding the normative
ground for professional ethics in service to society, in the fulfillment of
actual social needs, may provide for some students not only an
intellectual framework for professional moral reasoning, but perhaps also
some emotional motivation to conform to high ethical standards flowing
from having some ideal to identify with, to shape a sense of vocation, to
give meaning to one's place in the world. It may provide a larger social
vision for lawyering than simply the ad hoc service to particular clients.
The central problem with the role morality approach, however, is that
we may seriously doubt whether conventional role expectations are
worthy of being translated into ethical obligations. Perhaps the role
expectations need to be destroyed or transformed before we can treat
them as moral obligations. I, for one, doubt that the adversary system is
a good form of dispute resolution, and I doubt that liberal individualism
provides an adequate base for interpersonal justice. In short, I reject much
of the ideology upon which lawyers' role morality is based. This problem
is illustrated by the social role morality model popularized by Professor
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Monroe Freedman in his classic 1975 book.9 Again based primarily on
the social legitimacy of the adversary system and the ideology of
individual legal rights, Freedman clearly illustrated that professional
morality could be seen as strongly differentiated from personal morality.
The professional role of the lawyer in the legal system sometimes
demanded that the lawyer had to pursue immoral but legal ends, had to
cross-examine to discredit witnesses that the lawyer knew were telling the
truth, and even had to present perjury if required to uphold the higher
principle of lawyer-client confidentiality, and so forth. The role of the
lawyer in society justified behaviour that ordinary morality would
condemn. Of course, the moral justification for this role-differentiated
behaviour in specific cases would be found at a "higher level" in the
overall justice and morality of the adversary system and the upholding of
individual legal rights. Thus professional responsibility under this model
involved understanding and finding the moral justification for the role
demands of the profession. The need for study of professional ethics was
highlighted precisely because of the conflict between ordinary morality
and professional morality.
However, the problem is that while the current conventions of
professional ethics obviously reflect and are rooted, to a considerable
degree, in various social realities (the ideology of the adversary system of
dispute resolution, the ideology of legalism, the economic base of a free-
market system, the socio-political base of democratic liberalism and so
forth), any critical reflection on these matters may well lead at least some
students to a rejection of some of the current professional norms, as I
have done, because the social systems and institutions that justify the
norms are seen as fundamentally unjust in the first place. To look to the
morality of "society" for justification of professional morality does not in
itself get very far unless you can justify the morality of "society" in the
first place. We have competing visions of what just social ordering entails
and thus we have the personal moral dilemmas of the lawyer who finds
no higher systemic justification for some of the current hegemonic
professional norms that apply to him or her. Even if the social role
morality model is seen as a valid process to derive professional norms, it
does not provide the content of the norms in any uncontroversial way,
due to the wide disagreement as to what the social role of lawyers should
be and what the just ordering of the legal system should entail. The
amount of discretion that should exist within the profession to base
professional norms on competing visions of what the social role of the
profession is, or should be, becomes a crucial issue, an issue of
9. M. H. Freedman, Lawyers'Ethics In An Adversary System (Bobbs-Merrill, 1975).
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professional responsibility in its own right. Obviously, at some point the
discretion of the professional must end if regulation of the profession is to
proceed at all, and if clients are to have some settled expectations of what
lawyers do. What that point will be depends on what the dominant
hegemonic ideology of the social role of the lawyer in society is. The
bottom line, however, is that teachers of professional responsibility will
continually find students who do not accept the role-differentiated model,
even if the teacher does. These students insist that professional norms
should flow more directly out of ordinary personal moral norms,
reasoning and sensibilities. The context of being in the role of lawyer may
add a lot of situational factors to take into account in ordinary moral
reasoning, but basically there should be functional conformity between
ordinary morality and professional morality, rather than the discontinuity
that appears to exist. Many students do not find any justification for
separating their moral identity into two parts, one personal and one
professional. Rather, they seek some way of grounding professional
morality in personal morality, adjusting of course to the complex realities
of legal institutions and the representation of clients, rather than the other
way around, of having the institutional demands of professional role
overwhelm and displace ordinary morality. Roles may be viewed flexibly
as moral opportunities in which different people may take different
approaches, rather than inflexibly as demanding one course of action
from all by some systemic logic of the role.
The need, however, to find a "higher" systemic justification for the
apparent conflict between personal morality and professional role
morality, between ordinary morality and the behaviour apparently
expected of lawyers in their role as professionals, makes some sort of
social role morality model popular. Instead of Fuller's or Freedman's
model, largely loyal to the present system, Professor Bayles has recently
written a provocative and coherent book that argues for a professional
responsibility model based on the substantive values of "liberal" society
which he posits are governance by law, freedom, protection from injury,
equality of opportunity, privacy and welfare.10 Bayles asserts that
professional norms should be formulated to advance these social interests.
He then indicates the many ways that current professional ethical rules,
principles and practices sometimes do uphold these interests, but often do
not do so, and he makes suggestions for reform. Thus, adopting some
social role morality model is not per se to adopt uncritically the current
dominant ways that lawyers justify behaviour.
10. M. D. Bayles, ProfessionalEthics, (Wadsworth, 1981).
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However, what tends to happen in my classroom is that the current
role expectations are used to explain lawyer behaviour and then
explanation and moral justification all too easily slide into each other. It
is too easy and comfortable to assert that lawyers are performing a
necessary public service and thus we are doing something worthy with
our lives. This avoids asking the deeper personal question of identify and
vocation in a world of personal and systemic evil.
2. Lawyer's Law
In the 1950's, when Professor Fuller formulated a social role morality
model, the then existing A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics (1908), as
amended from time to time, were drafted in very general horatory terms,
not unlike the Canadian Bar Association's Canons of Legal Ethics
(1920). A lawyer faced with an ethical problem would not usually find
a particular "answer" by reaching for the Canons. In a sense then, the
social role morality model provided a context for individual moral
reasoning where professional norms had not been crystallized and
legalized into detailed, statutory-like forms. Since that time there has been
enormous pressure to legalize professional ethics resulting in increasingly
detailed codes of conduct, and a plethora of judicial decisions and Bar
Association committee opinions. It is now possible to say that the legal
profession is a regulated industry with a considerable body of law that
applies to its members, and it is scandalous for law students to study the
law of torts, trusts, contracts or whatever, but not the law of the
profession they are joining. However, what might be called the "lawyer's
law" model of professional responsibility is also fraught with
disagreements and dangers.
On one level, some resistance to the lawyer's law approach may stem
from questionable motives. Law students are quick to argue that more
legal regulation and enforcement is needed for all sorts of activity, but
when they study lawyers as the subjects of legal regulation there is a
change in tune. Perhaps lawyers develop some kind of "exemption
mentality" where they see themselves as making and applying and
manipulating law for everyone else, but standing above it all when it
comes to the application of law to their own professional lives. Maximal
autonomy to do as one thinks best, and deregulation are argued by the
very same students who want so much to channel life into the paths of
justice by the force of law.
At another level, however, the movement to the lawyer's law model in
the professional responsibility field is quite understandable. First, lawyers
as a group may also have a built-in bias by the nature of their calling to
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prefer legalism over situationalism." Absent a binding rule, when faced
with an ethical situation in which the conflicting interests of client,
lawyer, third parties, and the public are at stake, each lawyer must
recognize the interests at stake, weigh and balance all the factors and
make a decision in each situation. However, the weight to give to the
various competing interests involves subjective ambiguity and judgement
even within an acceptable social role morality theory. Therefore, the
advantages of drafting prior detailed rules, the advantage in short of
legalism over situationalism, is that a measure of certainty, predictability,
and enforceability is supposedly attainable. By analogy to criminal law
and the principal of legality, we adopt the idea that someone should not
be found guilty of professional misconduct except by breach of formally
promulgated law that one can have prior notice of. The application of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to lawyer disciplinary proceedings will
undoubtedly hasten this movement to the legalization of professional
ethics.
Secondly, the lawyer's law model arises out of the reality of moral
pluralism. If we consider moral values to be subjective and relative, we
must then establish some procedure for value positions to be debated and
then voted on, and then produce a code of conduct expressing the
dominant view, after which time the code is an objective fact Now we
can deal with professional rules as positive facts (what is), without
constantly arguing about subjective values (what ought to be). In a sense,
legalization arises more out of lack of confidence in morality than it does
out of moral consensus.
Thirdly, the lawyer's law model, ironically, is also reinforced by any
movement to attempt basic reforms of lawyer behaviour. Any sharp
departure from conventional practice and ideology requires legal
legitimation and enforcement to be successful. A good example of this is
the position taken by Professor Patterson 2 who was a consultant to the
Kutack Commission which drafted the new A.B.A. Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.13 Professor Patterson objected to the simple agency
ideology of professional responsibility that made loyalty to the client not
only primary but largely exclusive of other duties, whether to legal
11. See J. R. Elkins, MoralDiscourse and Legalism in Legal Education (1982), 32 J. of Legal
Ed. 11.
12. See, L. R. Patterson, Legal Ethics: The Law of Professional Responsibiliy, (2nd ed.,
Matthew Bender, 1984) and Patterson, The Function of a Code of LegalEthics (1981), 35 U.
of Miami L. Rev. 695.
13. Model Rules of Professional Conduc, (A.B.A., 1983). These rules as adopted have been
substantially revised from the Commission's initial Discussion Draft (1980) and the Proposed
Draft (1981).
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institutions, opposing parties, unrepresented third parties, or social
interests generally. He would have redressed this unbalanced situation by
promulgating rules based on a reciprocal agency model of professional
responsibility that contained not just the duties of a lawyer to the client
and others, but also reciprocally, the duties of the client to the lawyer and
to other interests.14 In other words, he wanted rules of professional
conduct that actually applied to the client of professional services, as
much as to the professional providing the service. For example, details
about how the client could not use a lawyer to avoid candor to a court
or in negotiation, or how a client could not use a lawyer as an instrument
of unfairness to others were proposed. If lawyers can do immoral things
by the justification that they are simply upholding a client's legal rights,
then all we need to do is change what the client has a legal right to, in
terms of lawyers' behaviour on their behalf. However, such a reformist
position that breaks sharply with conventional ideology obviously needs
a comprehensive legal base to succeed, as Professor Patterson
acknowledged.
Given these understandable pressures then, we have witnessed an
explosive growth of lawyer's law, particularly in the United States. The
A.B.A. Model Code of Professional Conduct of 1969 served the dual
purpose of regulation and inspiration, by containing, first, merely
directory ethical considerations that were meant to express the ideals that
lawyers should strive for, and then, secondly, detailed disciplinary rules
that expressed the minimum and mandatory duties that lawyers could be
disciplined for breaking. However the new 1983 A.B.A. Model Rules of
Professional Conduct replacing the 1969 Code, as the change in title
indicates, are drafted in "law form." The Canadian Bar Association's
Code of Professional Conduct of 1974 contains some commentary that is
rule-like, but despite being a great advance over the 1920 Canons, the
1974 Code is not as detailed as even the 1969 A.B.A. Code was. Thus we
have not as yet attempted to truly legalize professional ethics in Canada.
What the current C.B.A. Commission to examine the Code will come up
with remains to be seen, however.15
Of course, the lawyer's law approach also includes the common law
developments. Increasingly some areas of professional responsibility, like
conflict of interests, are being litigated and principles of professional
responsibility are being laid down by the courts. The application of the
Charter to issues involving the delivery of legal services and the
14. Supra, note 12 and also Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty (1980),
29 Emory LJ. 909.
15. The National C.B.A. Executive has formed a Special Committee to review and update if
necessary the 1974 C.B.A. Code
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governance of the profession will add to this trend. Again, however, the
scope of the case law in the United States is much greater, not only from
courts but also from reported committee hearings. The A.B.A. Standing
Committee on Ethics and Responsibility publishes formal and informal
opinions on matters referred to it by lawyers who seek advice on an
issue.16 Various state jurisdictions have such committees that publish
opinions as well.17 Finally, the A.B.A. has developed a centralized,
computerized information bank collecting the disciplinary hearings and
dispositions from every jurisdiction in the country so that precedents and
trends in discipline can easily be found.'8
As can be seen then, with the development of detailed Codes, and
volumes of case law, committee opinions, and disciplinary hearings, it is
easy to start treating the field of professional responsibility as simply a
law course in its own right.' 9 However the dangers of such a model are
as obvious as the pressures giving rise to it.
First of all, there are a number of pitfalls associated with legalism as an
ideology. Judith Shklar defines legalism as, "the ethical attitude that
holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral
relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules."20 To
focus on rule finding and following, instead of focusing on the process of
critical reasoning in each situation, may ultimately lead to an
abandonment of independent personal and moral responsibility and
judgement by the lawyer. Even if we assume that many of the Code rules
are morally justifiable, there is still a problem of minimalism. Instead of
striving for the best, the lawyer may go to "lawyer's law" to see what the
minimum duty is. This easy practicality of rule following ultimately may
lead to conformity with whatever is conventional, rather than the "sweat,
tears and prayer" involved in being a morally responsible agent. Professor
16. See Olavi Maru, Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions, (American Bar Foundation,
1970); Maru, 1975 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions, (A.B.F.,
1977).
17. Id See also: Wayyski and Pimsleur, Opinions from Committees on Professional Ethics
(Association of the Bar, City of New York, N.Y County Bar Association, N.Y State Bar
Association).
18. See National Centre for Professional Responsibility, A.B.A., Disciplinary Law and
Procedure Research System, looseleaf.
19. Reflected in such titles as G. Hazard and W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook
on the Model Rules of Professional Conduc4 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, (1985), and
Patterson, supra, note 12. For criticism of "legalistic" coursebooks, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Pedagogy Without Purpose" An Essay on Professional Responsibility Courses and Casebooks
(1985), A.B.E Res. J. 189. See also T. Schneyer, Professional Responsibility Casebooks and
the New Positivism: A Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, [1985] A.B.E Res. J. 943, and a reply
by Chemerinsky at 959.
20. J. Shklar, Legalism, (Harvard U.P., 1964) at 10.
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James Elkins has written a persuasive critique of how the teaching of
professional responsibility and legal education generally is mired in legal
discourse rather than taking moral discourse seriously.
21
The legal world view involving the categorization of experience into
formal rules, principles and concepts is just one of many points of view
through which we see the world. But to elevate this limited perspective
into a whole way of living our professional lives is to blind ourselves to
what it might mean to become a virtuous person and lawyer. We might
know about and conform to every law of lawyering, but not live a good
professional life. We might still, for example, have no genuine love,
concern, or care for anybody affected by our work and we might still
perpetuate or create a host of harms as a lawyer while acting fully within
the confines of the law of lawyering.
Secondly, the idea that legalism promotes uniform compliance and
enforcement may be doubted. Because a rule cannot be drafted in such
a way that the rule determines the scope of its own application in terms
of the purposes behind it, the rule inevitably has loopholes which will be
seized upon to violate the purpose of the law. Legalism not only fosters
uncritical minimalistic thinking, but also nihilistic thinking. Ironically,
legalism actually can be a kind of lawlessness. Lawyers become adept at
finding holes in the law and this applies to lawyer's law too. Although
this problem may be overcome to a degree by more sophisticated
interpretive techniques, the demand for more rules will often lead to
compliance with the letter, but violation of the spirit.
A third pitfall associated with the lawyer's law approach relates not so
much to legalism as an ideology but rather to a cluster of problems
involving the process and content of legalization. One of the most
pervasive criticisms of the 1969 A.B.A. Code was the unbalanced
emphasis in the Code on the ethics of the adversary system. Even when
the lawyer was involved in non-adversarial roles or in practice contexts
quite different from advocacy, the principles of ethics derived from the
role of the advocate often inappropriately formed the basis for the duties
of the lawyer.22 Furthermore, the context of modem law practice is
becoming increasingly complex and specialized. Thus it is difficult in the
process of legalization to be sensitive to all the various roles and contexts,
and the result will be that even assuming some moral justification for the
21. Supra, note 11. See also, Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics (1985), 10 The Journal of the
Legal Profession 37.
22. For criticism of the inappropriate extension of adversarial ethics, see, W. Rich, The Role
of Lawyers: BeyondAdvocacy (1980), Brigham Young L. Rev. 767; C. Frankel, Review of the
A.B.A. Code (1976), 43 Uni. of Ch. L. Rev. 874; R. McKay, Beyond Professional
Responsibility (1981), 10 Ca. U. L. Rev. 709.
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legalized norms, they may well be inappropriately applied to contexts
involving significantly different moral considerations.
There is also the controversy regarding the representational nature of
any code of conduct. Are the standards passed by the profession truly
representative of the profession's view of what is in the public interest, or
are they based largely on the views of the powerful interest groups in the
profession? Raising this issue implies that the profession is not so unified
that standards of conduct can always be justified without attention to
plurality of views and interests that transcend mere personal
disagreements on controversial issues. Even if the Code becomes fairly
representative of the profession's view, the point can still be made that it
is the profession which produces the Code, not clients or the public
generally. It is thus not hard to imagine how the interests of the profession
could predominate over that of other interests in the formulation of the
Code.'3 Indeed, the Code may primarily serve as a legitimation device to
make the profession appear to be ethical to the public.
Finally, another problem of having detailed and formal rules of
professional conduct is the paradox of not covering enough, but at the
same time covering too much! Discretion to be immoral may also at
times open up discretion to be moral in situations that might otherwise be
covered by rules which are in themselves immoral. If we try to formulize
a rule for all the ethical dilemmas of law practice we may well end up
with some essentially unethical rules. For example, if we pass a rule that
prohibits a lawyer from ever disclosing a confidence even when
disclosure would prevent severe harm (not just illegality) from occurring,
many lawyers would say that it is a good rule. Client confidences should
be placed above every other interest (except for the lawyer's own in
collecting fees or protecting his or her reputation!). But it might be argued
that it is a bad rule and one could marshall some strong moral reasons for
allowing disclosure of confidences in some situations that are now
arguably prohibited in our Code. If a rule is passed saying you must
disclose, strong disagreement arises from one camp of lawyers. If a rule
is passed saying you cannot disclose, strong disagreement arises from
another camp. If you say you may disclose, perhaps no one has been
satisfied, but at least the discretion to do what you think is morally right
has been granted, but at the cost of uniformity and settled client
expectations.
I am not saying here that we do not need codes of conduct, nor am I
saying that they should not be studied. However, given the problems with
23. SeeMorgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility (1977), 40 Harv. L. Rev.
702.
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legalism as an ideology, and the problems with the content and process
of legalization, no course in professional responsibility should focus
primarily on "lawyer's law" as a desirable approach to the problem of
professional decision making. We are constantly thrown back into
questions about the moral justification for the law that does exist, about
whether we should obey it, and about the continual need for moral
reasoning in spite of it.
3. Personal Moral Reasoning in Relational Context
The social role morality model looks primarily to some ideal operation
of the legal system for the normative ground of professional ethics.
Recently there has been a shift of emphasis away from the systemic and
toward the relational, and away from the professional and toward the
personal24 The fundamental ground of professional ethics is what the
relationship between the lawyer and the client, the lawyer and others, and
in a sense the lawyer with himself or herself should be. How we should
view ourselves and act toward ourselves, and in turn toward those who
depend on us or are affected by our actions is a central moral question for
those acting in a professional role as much as for those acting outside it.
We might label this approach the "personal moral reasoning in relational
context" model. Professional responsibility in this model involves the
ability to recognize and reason reflectively and critically on ethical issues
as they arise in practice and the ability to arrive at more personally
satisfying decisions about what courses of action to take. The
development of moral reasoning involves intellectual, emotional and
experiential learning. Students must be exposed to some of the literature
on ethical theory that relates directly to moral reasoning by lawyers.
Fortunately there are now a number of books to turn to.25 Students must
also face actual ethical problems within a context where open debate and
feedback from the instructor and fellow students helps the students to
24. See E. Dvorkin, J. Himmelstein, and H. Lesnick, Becoming a Lawyer A Humanistic
Perspective on Legal Education and Professionalism, (West, 1981), and Elkins, A Humanistic
Perspective in LegalEducation (1983), 62 Neb. L. Rev. 494.
25. See, Bayles, supra, note 10; D. Luban, ed., The Good Lawyer Lawyers' Roles and
Lawyers' Ethics, (Rowman and Allanheld, 1983); Goldman, The Moral Foundations of
Professional Ethics, (Roman & Littlefield, 1980); Reeck, Ethics for the Professions: A
Christian Perspective, (Augsburg, 1982); Campbell, Doctors, Lawyers, Ministers: Christian
Ethics in Professional Practice, (Abingdon, 1982); Cameniscb, Grounding Professional Ethics
in a Pluralistic Society, (Haven, 1983); Baumrin and Freedman, eds., Moral Responsibility and
the Professions, (Haven, 1983); Lebacqz, Professional Ethics Power and Paradox, (Abingdon,
1985); Shaffer, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer, (B.YU. Press, 1981); Shaffer, American
Legal Ethics, (Matthew Bender, 1985); Kipnis, Legal Ethics, (Prentice-Hall, 1986); Elliston,
and Davis, Ethics and the Legal Professio, (Prometheus, 1986).
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think explicitly about alternative responses, consequences of each
response, reasons that could be given to justify each response and
awareness of the value preferences that each response expresses. As
David Luban has stated:
26
The study of legal ethics is part of the study of ethics, and the study of
ethics is part of the study of philosophy... The role of the legal ethics
course should be to attempt to equip students with intellectual skills they
can use to pinpoint conflicts, analyze arguments, and discuss the questions
of principle that underly various ethical problems ... What is needed is
a literature that is philosophically sophisticated but specific to the legal
context.
As students work through the moral dilemmas faced by lawyers, and
while doing so clarify their own values and critically examine the
conventional positions of systemic role morality in the light of moral
philosophy, they may develop a much more reflective and holistic
approach to ethical decision-making which they will utilize as lawyers.
Of course, moral reasoning must be contextualized and the focus on
relationships will still have to deal with the systemic issues and other
broad social dynamics in which the relational questions are embedded.
However, moral reasoning sharpened by the discipline of applied
moral philosophy is only one part of the approach. At more basic levels
we are concerned not just about hard ethical choices that arise in practice,
but also with why we are lawyers at all, or what kind of lawyers we want
to be, or what we are as persons that lawyering actualizes or destroys.
This focus on the self may lead to the self-acceptance and assurance
that propels professional service to others, or it may propel us out of the
profession. But the conventional ideology that personal values and
professional values are different and separate must be dealt with. Perhaps
a satisfactory moral answer to justify role differentiated behaviour can be
arrived at, in which case the personal and professional will connect in a
satisfactory way. Perhaps not. In any case, I believe that students need to
arrive at a sense of how their vocation can be an expression of their own
identity and values. To bifurcate the professional and the personal is to
diminish both. The myth that lawyering involves the essentially neutral
application of a body of doctrine and technique must be shattered.
Lawyering is a personal and political activity; law is not a neutral body
of norms that equally benefits and protects us all, but is rather often used
instrumentally to legitimate and advance certain interests at the expense
26. D. Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A PhilosophicalResearch Program for LegalEthics
(1981), 40 Maryland L. Rev. 451 at 451,471.
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of other interests." A crucial question for a law student then is, "What
interests am I going to spend my life serving as a lawyer?" Another
crucial related question is, "What kind of lawyer do I want to be?" The
choices we make about these questions will to a significant degree
determine what we will become as persons, not just as professionals. For
example, professional "success" may be defined by somebody as best
attained in certain kinds of law firms that irrespective of the questions of
the worth of clientele ends served or means used, may operate in an
immoral fashion. Lawyers at such firms are required to work inhuman
hours, billing competition is rampant, hierarchy of partner-associate-staff
is firmly entrenched and somewhere along the way in this context the
financially and professionally "successful" lawyer often finds that he or
she has "lost their soul." The rate of personal, marital, and family
wreckage among professionals is itself a systemic moral question. Why
does professional life, so ideally geared to helping others, so often
translate rather into a harmfu hurtful professional lifestyle?
Another fundamental question relating to the self is "Can a good
person be a good lawyer?" As Elkins states:2
One who believes that professional morality is a matter of compliance
with the disciplinary Code fails to ask what it means to be a good lawyer.
To ask this question requires that one look more closely at whether a good
person can do what lawyers do in their practice - defend guilty clients,
take advantage of those whose attorneys inadequately represent them, and
help clients pursue aims that are detrimental to the social order. Can a
good person justify behaviour which directly harms identifiable third
parties and/or the social order because he is a lawyer?
Does the role of lawyer demand that we harm other interests while
advancing our client's interests in a way that no good person could
justify? Is it possible to choose clients and the means used to serve them
in a personally, morally satisfying way or must the lawyer play by the
conventional principles even if he or she disagrees with them? That is, can
a lawyer integrate self and professional role in a way that is good for him
or her?
Questions like these relating to our own values and how to make
meaningful vocational commitments are inherently anxiety provoking,
and within the context of apparently diminished personal career choices
doubly so. Students do not often see themselves as choosing where they
will work. In most cases they believe they have a limited choice as to
27. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, [1978] Wisconsin L. Rev. 29; Simon, Visions of
Practice in Legal Thought (1984), 36 Stanford L. Rev. 469; Auerbach, Unequal Justice"
Lawyers and Social Change in Modem America, (Oxford U. Press, 1976).
28. Elkins, supra, note 11 at 24.
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articling positions and often even less choice after articling is over.
Students may end up as lawyers specializing in some area of law not by
choice, but simply by fate. Students may equally feel that their ethical
decision-making is, in particular cases, constrained by the reality that for
many years they are not really independent agents but rather working for
a more senior lawyer who "determines" what should be done. These are
realities, to be sure, but any abdication of ethical freedom and
responsibility in the face of circumstances is already a first giant step to
becoming morally dead. Circumstances are factors to be taken into
account in ethical reasoning, not factors that in and of themselves
determine anything. We may indeed sympathize with the students in the
face of the economic and sociological realities of the profession, but we
must not thereby allow people to disclaim moral responsibility for
making life choices.
The second focus in on the lawyer-client relationship. Professor
Richard Wasserstrom, for example, has pointed out the irony of how
lawyers say they are "hired guns" for the client and yet when you actually
analyze lawyer-client relationships you often see that the lawyer is
dominant and paternalistic in relation to the client.29 Professional
dominance over clients is a central moral question. Perhaps, for example,
lawyers impute ends to clients that the clients do not actually have. We
assume that the client always wants to "beat the rap," for example.
Perhaps the client really wants to confess; wants to take responsibility for
what he has done. But we, as lawyers, should we get into the picture early
enough, will make sure the client does not talk to the police. Isn't that our
job? Lawyering has developed its own substantive value ideology of
maximum freedom or wealth that is regularly imputed to clients without
meaningful discourse between lawyer and client as to whether the
interests of the client actually fit into this simplified maximization
scheme. The same problem of imputing our values on the client is seen
in terms of the means used to pursue ends. Lawyers often claim that the
means questions are their own prerogative. But, how do we know that
our clever cross-examination to destroy the credibility of a witness we
think is telling the truth is really what the client would want us to do on
his or her behalf? Lawyers are too quick to assume that the morally
problematic aspects of professional behaviour are just "doing for the
client what the client would want to do for himself." The issue of the
moral autonomy of the client reciprocally raises the issue of the moral
29. R. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues (1975), 5 Human Rights
1. See also D. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client" Who's In Charge? (Russell Sage Foundation,
1974).
420 The Dalhousie Law Journal
autonomy of the lawyer. Some lawyers are dominated by their clients
rather than the other way around, in the sense that the lawyer does not
engage in independent moral discourse with the client, or does not have
any personal moral standards (aside from legality) that he will not cross
on behalf of any client. To retain your own moral integrity as a lawyer
does not involve the imposition of your values on a client, but merely
establishes the scope in which you personally will act on behalf of
someone - the scope of ends and means that you can justify as morally
worthy of your time and energy. To be sure, this may be theoretically
problematic in situations of lawyer scarcity or uniformity of values, but
such conditions rarely occur (for a paying client) and when they do, such
conditions may or may not be an acceptable moral reason for taking a
different approach.
Another moral problem common to the lawyer-client relationship is
the need to move beyond a narrow legalistic posture with clients and
move to a more holistic one, which takes seriously the emotional and
moral dynamics of the client's problem.30 To quickly reduce a problem to
its purely legal dimensions may allow the lawyer to find a legal
"solution" that is no solution at all because the problem is essentially non-
legal to begin with. Indeed the lawyer may have made the matter worse
rather than being of genuine help to the client.
The ethical choices we make are not just matters involving the intellect
(the head) but also emotional matters of the heart. Dr. Andrew Watson
has shown how not addressing the emotional and psychological side of
ethical conflicts leads to both an impoverished ability to reason morally
and also negatively affects the lawyer-client relationship which is fraught
with emotional dynamics of its own that need to be dealt with 31 The
client is not necessarily served at all if the lawyer has not been sensitive
to the client as a whole person and not just as a legal problem. Thus, in
a relational model the relationship between lawyer and client in terms of
dynamics and decision-making is at the heart of professional
responsibility.
A third focus is on the relationship of the lawyer to third parties who
are not his clients - opposite parties, or persons who are involved in a
case, or persons simply affected by the lawyer's work on behalf of a
client. Moral philosophers have started to produce a body of literature
30. See, T Shaffer, Legal interviewing and Counselling in a Nutshell (West, 1976).
31. See Watson, "Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsibility" in Teaching
Professional Responsibility, supra note 3 at 609; Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism." A
Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education (1975), 8 U. of Mich. L. R. 248; Watson,
The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency Disease (1974), 26 J. of Leg.
Ed. 441.
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that looks specifically at legal ethics, particularly the issue of the extent to
which we can justify harming others in the name of advancing our clients'
interests.32 Central to much of the literature is the denial that lawyers can
personally avoid responsibility for harm by hiding behind a client. What
we do on behalf of clients is still something that we do. Doing what is
legal is not necessarily doing what is morally right, and thus the difficult
philosophical questions arise about the legal profession's duty, if any, to
moral rights in a pluralistic society as opposed to purely legal rights.
All of this relational, psychological, and philosophical discourse may
frighten the reader as "soft," "mushy" and above all too "personally
subjective" to form any focus to teaching professional responsibility. But
this fear itself may be an example ,6f an existing narrow bias we have
about the value of that which we label "hard," "objective" and
"practical." To focus on the process of moral reasoning in the relational
context of lawyering seems to me to be the focus that is most needed and
most promising in terms of being meaningful to students.
III. How Should We Teach?: Informal Context and Formal Course
If the moral reasoning in relational context approach is desirable, how do
you "teach" it? Before confronting the methodological obstacles, we must
look at the larger law school experience to see if that is an obstacle in
itself.
Professional responsibility should be taught on two fronts at law
school. One front is the explicit focus in parts of the curriculum or
extracurriculum on the topic of the professional responsibility of lawyers,
whether by way of the pervasive method, the separate course method or
the clinical method. A second way, equally important, is that the whole
law school experience should support moral inquiry and model just
relationships. I call this professional responsibility as taught informally by
the context of the law school. Both of these areas of teaching should be
in harmony. The legal education context should support and reinforce the
formal teaching of professional ethics. However, I think that overall the
informal legal education context does not support the formal course, and
that is also one of the primary reasons that I am so dissatisfied with the
professional responsibility course.
1. Professional Responsibility Taught Informally by the Context of Law
School
If you take away any specific course on professional responsibility or the
32. Supra, note25.
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explicit discussion of professional responsibility issues in the clinical
setting or as part of some other doctrinal course, the rest of the law school
experience still indirectly transmits to students a host of messages about
professional responsibility issues that may either reinforce or frustrate or
negate the explicit teaching of professional responsibility. In this sense the
law school cannot avoid transmitting messages about vocational values
because any organized activity and institution contains a "collective
spirit" that impacts on participants in the institution. If we are going to
teach professional responsibility (and I suggest we cannot avoid it), then
we must address how the covert teaching of it can be made to correlate
with any overt teaching. If the law school experience covertly impacts on
the students' sense of the professional responsibility of the lawyer, the
impact will be more positive, I think, when the law school itself fulfills its
own professional responsibilities and thereby acts as a good role model.
First, the law school obviously has some responsibility for training in
professional competence.33 Even if law schools do not take upon
themselves the duty to train lawyers in all the basic skills, doctrines and
procedures necessary to start practice, the law degree is still the
fundamental entrance requirement into the profession. Many issues
involving competence could be looked at, but take evaluation of students'
work as just one example. If law schools do not set real standards of
adequate performance in regard to what they do teach, what message
about competency are students picking up? My experience has been that
a paper or examination has to be unredeemably bad before a failing mark
is given to it. In other words, it is relatively easy, given a degree of natural
talent, to drift through law school and get a law degree by minimal and
mediocre work. Fortunately, the vast majority of law students are not
satisfied with minimal work. But for some students there is an attitude of
carelessness to academic standards that the law school allows. Do we
foster an attitude that emphasizes that clients will depend on our skills
and judgement, and thus legal education must be a serious life-long
process of critical self-education and continuous self-evaluation? Or do
we foster an attitude that you can get by with the minimal and the
mediocre? In saying this, I do not think that a law school needs to be
inhumane or oppressively competitive to uphold real standards of
adequate student academic performance.
Of course, the more fundamental point is the quality of work by the
law professors. If law professors have a professional responsibility
involving scholarship, teaching and public service, the quality of the work
they do says much to the students about competence. What is the
message when there is a pattern of being unprepared for class, or a lack
33. See A.B.A. Task Force, Lawyer Competency: The Role of the Law Schools (1979).
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of keeping up with changes to the law in the subject matter taught, or an
inability to communicate ideas and concepts with clarity, or a
superficiality of treatment? The context of legal education as a whole
should teach students about the professional responsibility to be
competent, and also provide the tools for being competent, by teaching
how to learn the law and teaching how to be self-critical about
fundamental lawyer skills.
Secondly, legal academics have a special responsibility to critically
study the law, legal institutions, and legal practices and honestly explain
what they find. In a sense, unlike advocates who supposedly may argue
for an interpretation of fact or law on behalf of a client that they do not
personally believe in, the legal scholar has a coherent obligation to state
the truth as he or she finds it, without fear or favour to establish
interests.34 In this sense, legal scholars have a duty to be prophetic about
legal affairs - pointing out problems in need of reform and trying to
suggest more just arrangements. However, concern for justice and a
dedication to reform and a public leadership role in legal affairs is equally
the responsibility of the profession generally. Thus, if the law school does
not even take justice questions seriously, how can we expect that the
students will do so when they get into practice and face the temptations
of reducing law practice to simply serving whatever interests may pay
them the most?
To take justice questions seriously is to at least move beyond the
teaching of what is, and focus on the evaluation stage of what ought to
be. Yet the denial of even superficial moral discourse in legal education
can be glaringly overt. Professor Shaffer and Professor Redmount
witnessed the following exchange in the first session of a law school
Evidence course.35
Professor: What's a trial?
Student: An adversary proceeding.
Professor: For what purpose?
Student: To discover the truth. (Silence, then laughter)
Professor: Who cares what truth is?
Student: I care. (Loud laughter)
Professor: Well, in your conversations with God, you can take those
questions further. (To a second stulnt): What's the purpose
of a trial?
34. See Anthony Kronman, Foreward.- Legal Scholarship and Moral Education (1981), 90
Yale L.J. 955.
35. T. Shaffer and R. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Students, andPeople (1977) at 181-182.
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There is also the legendary story of the professor in a first year class
grilling a student about an appellate opinion. After much effort, the
student was able to state accurately what the result of the case was. After
a pause, the student added: "But that's not just!" and the professor
answered, "If you wanted to study justice you should have gone to
divinity school. '3 6 This sort of overt cynicism toward moral questions is
probably rare, but there is still a covert cynicism that is more common,
and the effect is pretty much the same. Even if the "moral moment" is
benignly acknowledged, but there is still a systemic exclusion of
normative questions in the teaching of law, students will probably
develop an attitude like, "I'm too busy learning the law to be worried
about the justice of it."
If the primary focus of legal education is on the teaching of craft skills
and the acquisition of a body of doctrinal information without any
sustained attempt to be critical of this material, then legal education will
powerfully retard the formation of critical thinking and judgement on
justice issues. If the policy questions of doctrinal justification and the
conscience questions of skill utilization are continually treated as
peripheral, students are socialized into uncritically believing that law is
some neutral body of principles and rules rather than an instrument for
justice or injustice.3 7 In short, law students may largely accept the
conservative status quo of law, legal institutions and legal practices,
because legal education essentially accepts the status quo. To the extent,
however, that the curriculum is open to interdisciplinary courses and
normative analyses of doctrine in traditional courses, the law school can
foster the attitudinal foundation necessary for reformist public leadership
and involvement by the profession.
Thirdly, if professional responsibility is centrally concerned with the
lawyer-client relationship, the context of legal education as a whole may
impact on this by the model provided by the professor-student
relationship. As Wasserstrom suggests, ".... the ways in which life (can
be) arranged and lived within law school are important because of what
they exemplify and teach about justice and goodness in particular
individual and institutional contexts. '38 There have been criticisms made
that law professors are generally domineering and disrespectful of
36. T. Shaffer, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer, supra, note 25 at 166.
37. See Edward Bloustein, Social Responsibility, Public Policy and the Law Schools (1980),
55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 385; Thomas Schaffer, Law Faculties as Prophets (1980), 5 J. of Legal Prof.
45; Jerold Auerbach, What Has the Teaching of Law To Do with Justice? (1978), 53 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 457.
38. R. Wasserstrom, Legal Education and the Good Lawyer (1984), 34 J. of Legal Ed. 155 at
160.
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students as persons and this then reinforces in the students the attitude
that when they are professionals they can in turn dominate their clients.
39
As well, the kind of relationship between students that the law school
subtly reinforces can model later professional stances. For example, if the
law school exclusively fosters competition among students rather than
having group projects that value cooperation, a normative message about
how professionals should operate is sent out. In addition, the way that the
administration of the law school deals with students can be a model of a
sensitive, humane, responsive legal institution as opposed to a model of
a cold bureaucracy.
Fourthly, there is the basic question of whether the professional
responsibility of the law professor and the law student is taken seriously
in the context of the law school, or whether there is instead an attitude
that professional responsibility only exists after law school and outside it,
rather than in it. There have been a few voices calling for a code of
professional responsibility for law teachers.40 While I have doubts about
professional codes, surely the idea, as we have seen, is that law teachers
by their conduct send messages about professional conduct to students. It
may seem a petty point to say that a professor should not be late for class,
or should have the marks in on time, or should not cancel classes without
good reasons, but out of these seemingly petty matters arise important
professional responsibility issues. Probably the greatest number of client
complaints made against lawyers involve that of delay, lack of diligence,
and failure to communicate with the client. Further, if professional
responsibility includes generous non-remunerative involvement in
professional and public affairs rather than exclusive devotion to
remunerative client service, then it is an important issue whether law
professors are being professional when they never show up for any extra-
curricular events at the law school like guest lectures or panels or social
activities. More importantly, if law professors spend a considerable
amount of time away from the law school practicing law for money
instead of doing scholarship, administration, or being available to
students, it may well be asked what kind of example of professionalism
they are modelling for students.
39. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy (1982), 32 J.
Legal Ed. 591; T. Pickard, Experience as Teacher The Politics of Law Teaching (1983), 33 U.
of T. L.J. 279.
40. Robert McKay, Ethical Standards for Law Teachers (1971), 25 Arkansas L. Rev. 44;
Norman Redlich, Professional Responsibility of Law Teachers (1980), 29 Cleveland St. L.
Rev. 623; Norman Redlich, Law Schools as Institutional Teachers of Professional
Responsibility (1984), 34 J. of L. Ed. 215; Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional
Responsibility of the Law Professor Three Neglected Questions (1986), 39 Vanderbilt L. Rev.
275.
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Law professors in reality are more insulated from accountability than
practising lawyers are, even with the weaknesses of the client complaint
system and the disciplinary procedures in the legal profession. Academic
freedom and tenure are crucial in the academic world but an unfortunate
side effect may be that, aside from gross violations of duty, formal
accountability of professors is very weak. Law schools, thus, must find
informal ways to encourage compliance with the professional duties of
the legal scholar.
It may also be asked whether students of law should not have greater
professional responsibility accountability during the whole course of law
school, aside from those occasions in clinical courses where the student is
representing a client. Various proposals for student codes of conduct have
been made.41 Such codes may deal with a host of issues, from class
attendance to matters of personal integrity while in law school. To hold
students accountable to any more than the academic passing of
examinations is fraught with difficulty, of course. There is still a problem
of whether law schools should be seen as training people for professional
work only, or whether law school should also be seen as academic units
of the university open to students who may never want to join the
profession, but nevertheless want to study law. Do we assume that the
study of law is not as yet entry into the profession as such, so that only
the ordinary university rules of student conduct and no more can be
expected of law students? Perhaps this is formally the case, but there is
still an attitude that can be advanced in law school - an attitude that
students are expected to contribute to the school and take from the law
school experience much more than the piece of paper necessary to go to
the next step.
In conclusion, the whole context of legal education transmits values.
Given that this context is made up by the actions of a diverse assbrtment
of professors and students within a framework of great autonomy of
action, it is very difficult to simply change the "collective spirit" if it needs
changing. Perhaps just debating our responsibilities collectively will lead
to some new understandings and changed behaviours. However, the best
hope for this is to foster a community at law school where people can
confront each other within the context of genuine care and commitment
to each other. Confrontation without a framework of caring community
just leads to rounds of defensive warfare. However, genuine community
41. Donald Weckstein, Perspective Courses and Co-Curricular Activities (1968), 41 U. of
Col. L. Rev. 398; John Bradway, Restraints: A Proposalfor a Student Code of Ethics (1976),
3 Northern Kentucky L. Forum 133; L. Biernat, Why Not Model Rules of Conduct For Law
Students? (1984), 12 Florida State U.L. Rev. 781; F Snyder, S. Goza, Law Student Honor
Codes (1983), 76 Law Library J. 585.
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does not fit with the reality of liberal individualism as the dominant
ideology of the law school. Thus, it would seem that the course in
professional responsibility utilizing the personal moral reasoning in
relational context approach will likely face a "hostile" reception for some
time to come, and we must accept that the course may be partially
crippled by this fact.
2. Professional Responsibility Taught Formally by a Course of Study in
Law School
We move now to the formal or direct teaching of professional
responsibility at law school. Despite my current dissatisfaction with the
course, my thesis is that the subject of professional responsibility should
be a mandatory part of the curriculum in at least three places. First, there
should be a required first-year course which includes in it a substantial
component on the legal profession and professional responsibility.
Usually this will be a legal process course, but perhaps some other first-
year course could contain this material as well. Secondly, there should be
a required course on the legal profession and professional responsibility
in second or third year. Finally, there should be at least one clinical
course available to every student who wishes to take such a course, and
professional responsibility should be aprimary focus of such a course. My
thesis is that all three of these components are necessary, and that they
should not be considered as alternatives by arguing that one component
is better than another. A higher level separate course in professional
responsibility will not have enough hours in it to adequately deal with
both the broad issues of the legal profession - like governance,
mechanisms of delivery of legal services, sociology and history of the
profession - and the more particular issues of legal ethics - like
confidentiality, conflict of interest, candor, competence, and so forth.
Some of this material can usefully be taught in first year and indeed ought
to be introduced to the student as early as possible and this then would
allow the upper-level course to be built sequentially on the material
already covered in first year. A clinical course alone would not be able
to cover with substantial depth and coherence the field of professional
responsibility, given the other pedagogical goals that such courses
inevitably have. However, the course in professional responsibility alone
will not provide the realistic relational context provided by the clinical
experience. Thus, my opinion is that all three forms must be coordinated
and are complementary and necessary.
(a) The Pervasive Teaching of Professional Responsibility
Aside from these three components, some mention must be made of the
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concept of the pervasive teaching of professional responsibility. The label
"pervasive" must be clarified first. I would prefer to label the informal
teaching of professional responsibility by the whole context of legal
education as the true pervasive approach. However, in the literature this
label has been given to the approach of spreading out the formal teaching
of professional responsibility by making it a part of a number of
substantive and procedural courses, in distinction to having a separate
concentrated course in professional responsibility. The pervasive
approach has been well defined by Smedley and Thode as follows:
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... professional responsibility matters are to be considered as a natural
component of the regular law school courses and that the teaching of
professional responsibility is to be undertaken as an integral part of
instruction in the substantive and procedural law. Though he did not use
the phrase "pervasive method," one of our late colleagues stated the idea
in general terms more than a dozen years ago when he observed that
"training for professional responsibility and for awareness of the role of
law in society is not a matter which can be parcelled out and assigned to
a certain member of the faculty at a certain hour, but is the job of all law
teachers all of the time."
The ultimate objective of the program is to introduce law students to some
of the situations they may expect to encounter as practicing attorneys,
situations which will raise questions as to their obligations to the public, to
the profession, to the courts, and to their colleagues at the bar, as well as
to their clients. By raising these issues at points of natural relevance in
various law school courses, the teacher helps the student view them in the
context of a lawyer's over-all professional functions; and the study of legal
ethics and the lawyer's broader public responsibilities thus becomes a
constituent of legal education....
Though this may well be "a job for all law teachers at all times," even a
fully structured pervasive approach program would not be expected to
extend to all courses in a law school curriculum or to involve all faculty
members. Such a broad effort would overload the teachers, require the
diversion of too much teaching time, and worst of all, surfeit the student's
mind with professional responsibility matters. Instead, it is necessary to
select a number of courses whose subjects lend themselves readily to
pervasion and whose professors are favorably disposed toward and skillful
in pervasive teaching. This might be only a half-dozen courses, or it might
be a dozen or more, depending on the preferences of the individual faculty
and on the amount of professional responsibility teaching being done by
other methods. The main consideration here is that the pervasion takes
place in courses from the beginning to the end of the student's law school
career and that all students are reached by the program several times
42. T.A. Smedley and E.W. Thode, "The Pervasive Approach: Summary and Evaluation
Report" in Education in the Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer, supra, note 2 at 116-
117. (Also found in (1969), 41 U. of CO. L. Rev. 365).
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during their three years in school. A sufficiently effective system might call
for the pervasion of two or three required first-year courses, and a couple
of required or generally elected courses in the second and third years, plus
a half-dozen other elective courses which students take during these latter
two years.
The pervasive approach in distinction to the concentrated approach
was much discussed at the 1956 national conference, but what has
sometimes been overlooked is that the two approaches were not treated
as alternatives. As Stone said:43
There was, it is believed, no one at the conference so enthusiastic about the
potentiality or desirability of pervasive teaching that he thought that this
would render unnecessary the continuing development of courses
concentrated on the responsibility aspect.
Naturally, however, some schools, notably Vanderbilt, subsequently
adopted the pervasive approach as a better way of teaching professional
responsibility than having a separate course.44
By dealing with professional responsibility issues as they arise in
substantive and procedural courses, the student may better appreciate
how such issues are directly relevant to all legal contexts and are an
integral part of legal reasoning. The importance of professional
responsibility is reinforced by having a substantial number of professors
address these issues across a number of courses rather than having one
time slot for ethics, like a "Sunday morning church service." Given these
advantages, interest in the pervasive approach continued at the next
national conference in 1968 where the advantages and disadvantages
were discussed,45 and examples of how professional responsibility could
be taught in various courses were offered. 46 The conference passed a
resolution encouraging casebook editors to develop more segments on
professional responsibility in their materials.47 By the time the 1977
conference, however, the pervasive approach was hardly mentioned at
all.48
43. J. Stone, supra; note 1 at 252.
44. T. Smedley, The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale - The Vanderbilt Experiment
(1963), 15 J. Legal Ed. 435.
45. Supra, note 42.
46. Covington, "Experiences in an Insurance Course," A.L. Levin, "The Lawyer's Professional
Responsibility in Trial Advocacy and Civil Procedure," M.H. Freedman, "Teaching Legal
Ethics in the Contracts Course," L.B. Snyder, "Professional Responsibility in Federal Tax
Practice," in Education in the Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer, supra, note 2 at 124,
135, 151 and 163.
47. Supra, note 2 at 356.
48. See supra, note 3.
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The reason for this loss in interest is that the pervasive approach as an
alternative to the concentrated approach will rarely succeed. It is difficult
to direct and structure and mandate such teaching in the context of
faculty autonomy and thus unstructured ad hoc directives to teach
pervasively will usually mean that the topic is pervasively ignored within
the inevitable struggle to find time to teach more substantive doctrine.
Even if a directive is structured and enforced, instead of integrating
professional responsibility into legal education, the pervasive approach
ironically may isolate it. Little bits of professional responsibility are
tacked on here and there rather than teaching the subject as meriting a
course in its own right. The fractured nature of the teaching does not
allow for a coherent systemic overview of the field. However, use of the
pervasive method may be very helpful if coordinated with a concentrated
course of instruction.49
Most importantly, however, the pervasive approach will likely be
legalistic or role-morality oriented. It is likely, for example, that in a class
on Wills and the Administration of Estates, various ethical problems like
doubts about testamentary capacity or problems involving conflicts when
taking instructions from a married couple, and so forth will be discussed.
But it is unlikely that the instructor will broaden the conversation into the
fundamental issues of being a lawyer in general.
Professor Cotter's survey of the Canadian scene50 reveals that while a
few schools informally encourage all professors to address professional
ethics issues, this is perceived as being unsuccessful in implementation.
Apparently only the University of Victoria Law School has formally
structured a program.5' As well as offering a course in the legal profession
and teaching professional responsibility in the clinical courses, the law
school in Victoria teaches professional responsibility as a segment in both
the required Legal Process and the required Criminal Law courses in first
year, as a segment of the Civil Procedure course required in the second
year, and as part of the Evidence course required in the second or third
year. There are a number of other courses that include professional
responsibility components as well. The Victoria Law School is one of the
most recently established in Canada, and as such has perhaps been in a
position to structure the curriculum with more colleagial understanding
and commitment. Perhaps this is why it has been successful with the
49. See, Rogers, An Approach to the Teaching of Professional Responsibility to First-Year
Law Students (1977), 4 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 800.
50. When mention is made of what Canadian law schools are currently doing on the topic of
Professional Responsibility, I am very much indebted to the survey conducted by Professor W.
Brent Cotter of Dalhousie Law School, in 1984 (See Appendix at the end of article).
51. Letter to Professor W. Brent Cotter, from Dean Lyman R. Robinson, June 21, 1984.
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pervasive approach. It will be interesting to see whether the approach can
be sustained over the long run, however.
While Victoria appears to be the only school that has anything
resembling a real pervasive approach, the teaching of a segment on the
legal profession and professional responsibility as a component of the
first-year Legal Process course is more widespread in Canada. This could
hardly be called "pervasive" since it is only one course, but I deal with
it here in the sense that a particular course is "pervaded" with some
segment on professional responsibility. The law schools of Saskatchewan,
Victoria, Manitoba, Calgary and McGill all have first-year Legal Process
courses that include explicitly some segment on the legal profession and
professional responsibility.52 There may be other schools that do the same
thing that I am not aware of. The University of Toronto law school has
a segment as part of the first year Civil Procedure course.53 So long as the
content and quality of the segment is substantial, I think this approach is
very useful for several reasons.
First, I would argue that students should be exposed to a substantial
segment of materials and classroom discussion on the legal profession and
professional responsibility in first year. The critical questions of, "What
kind of lawyer do I want to be?"; "Can a good person be a good
lawyer?"; and "How do I realize myself through a career in law?" are
often asked by students from day one in law school. If they are not asked,
they should be. Behind the initial excitement and anxiety-ridden process
of learning to "think like a lawyer" and make sense of the mass of
doctrinal material in first year, students are faced with the underlying role
conflicts about becoming lawyers. What student has not heard from a
family member or a friend upon being accepted into law school, some
comments like the following: "So how are you going to defend people
you know are guilty?" "So you are going to join the liars?" "So you have
given up on idealism and are finally going into something where you can
make a lot of money." Underlying the self-pride in being accepted into a
powerful and elitist professional class, the first-year student is also faced
with the reality that the public not only envies but also abhors laywers.
The fundamental questions about becoming a lawyer should not be "put
off" to second or third year but rather critical reflection on them should
be welcomed in first year. Devoting some time to the history of the
profession, the various roles of lawyers, alternative modes of legal service
delivery, basic lawyer-client relationship models and so forth, will give
students perspectives as they think about role-related questions.
52. See Cotter Survey, supra, note 50.
53. Id
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Secondly, legal education too often lacks any meaningful sequential
learning experience. Second and third year can be largely "doing the
same thing as first year by just taking more casebook courses." Not only
should there be new skills developed from year to year, but also what has
been covered before should be reinforced and built upon year by year so
that there is a vertical progressive mode, as it were, rather than merely a
horizontal passing of three years of discreet courses.
Thirdly, the upper level course in the legal profession is invariably only
a two or three-weight one-term course54 that cannot hope to do justice to
the topic. Courses will either focus more broadly on the responsibility of
the profession as a whole vis delivery of legal services, self-regulation and
accountability to the public, law reform, and so forth; or the course will
concentrate more on lawyers' ethical dilemmas - conflict of interest,
confidentiality, withdrawal, etc.55 In my experience, it has been
impossible to cover the field in even a superficial degree within the time
constraints. Thus, coordinating a first-year component with a higher-level
component seems a more sensible solution to coverage than spreading the
subject all over the map.
(b) A Course in Professional Responsibility
i. Manditory?
While Dean Bowker of Alberta recommended a specific course on
professional responsibility back in the 1950's,56 the modern trend in this
direction was pioneered by Professor Harry Arthurs at Osgoode Hall
where 20 years ago he began to offer an optional seminal called "The
Legal Profession" to second and third-year students. He also wrote an
article on why the legal profession should be a field of study in the law
school.57 Since that time, as Professor Cotter's survey shows,58 most law
schools have introduced a course on the legal profession, or on
professional responsibility, or as we call it in Manitoba, "The Legal
Profession and Professional Responsibility." It appears on the surface
level that such a course has gained a firm foothold in Canadian legal
education with almost all schools offering it.59 However, as we move to
a consideration of course materials and methods, this foothold is in my
54. Id, Q. 6.
55. Id
56. W.E Bowker, Legal Ethics (1956), 1 AIta. L. Rev. 71.
57. H.W Arthurs, The Study of the Legal Profession in the Law School (1970), 8 Osg. H. L.J.
183.
58. Cotter, supra, note 50, Q. 1.
59. Id
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opinion still quite tenuous. In addition, the overall number of students
exposed to the course is still quite small, as most schools have one section
of the course with approximately 20-25 students enrolled.60 While
overall enrollment varies from school to school, I would estimate that less
than 20 per cent of the total Canadian law school population actually
enrolls in a course in professional responsibility. Thus the question I pose
is not just whether there ought to be such a course in the curriculum, but
whether it should be mandatory rather than elective.
That there should be at least an elective course has been answered in
the affirmative by the vast majority of Canadian schools. The "academic"
study of law, even for a person who has no intention of becoming a
lawyer, must include the study of institutions and actors in the legal
system. The study of the behaviour of lawyers as actors in the legal
system is as important, if not more so, than the study of any body of
doctrinal law or the study of judicial actors. One does not have to go to
the more usual "practical" arguments about the value of such a course in
the training of lawyers to justify the offering, though I believe such
practical arguments are legitimate.
Whether the course should be offered or even made mandatory
ultimately depends on our view of what the course is about and what the
course contributes to legal education and how important that
contribution is. A number of arguments for the value of the course arise
out of the value of each of the three "content" models of professional
responsibility dealt with earlier - that law students should systematically
and critically study the role of lawyers in society; the law applicable to
lawyers; and the moral considerations of professional practice. Since legal
education is not value-neutral and some professional responsibility issues
will inevitably be dealt with covertly and often badly, is all the more
reason to address such issues explicitly and critically in a formal course
of study. That the course has some impact on the future lives of students
is a controversial issue that I leave to the last section of this paper.
While arguments for offering the course are not hard to come by,
arguments for mandating the course are understandably more
controversial. In the wake of Watergate, the American Bar Association in
1974 enacted an accreditation rule that required law schools to teach
professional ethics. The A.B.A. Standards for the Approval of Law
Schools now requires under Standard 302(a)(iii) that the law schools,
"offer and provide and require for all student candidates for a
professional degree, instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the
legal profession. Such required instruction need not be limited to any
60. Id, Q. 4b, 4c.
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pedagogical method as long as the history, goals, structure, and
responsibility of the legal profession and its members, including the
A.B.A. Code, are all covered."' 6' Thus, most American law schools now
require every student to take a course on professional responsibility as the
method to fulfill this requirement. In a 1977 survey of 156 law schools,
137 (85%) mandated a course, while almost all the others had elective
offerings of the course.62 Compare this to the Canadian situation. Only
Manitoba and Alberta require the course. However, 60 per cent of the
respondents to the Cotter survey thought that the course should be
mandatory in Canada.63 I suppose, however, that if you surveyed teachers
in any currently elective course, a good number would recommend that
their course should be compulsory. We may tend to believe in the
importance of the courses we teach more than the importance of the
courses others teach. Still, how could I argue for mandating a course that
I feel so dissatisifed with?
I suspect that the leaders of the profession might argue that the course
should be mandatory out of an expectation that the course will help
socialize students into acceptance of conventional ethical positions,
thereby reducing to a degree the problems of professional discipline that
might otherwise occur without such exposure. But the ultimate effect on
the numbers of client complaints and disciplinary costs when we move to
a compulsory ethics course in law school is uncertain and probably
marginal at best. The reason for mandating the course is not to help
enforce the profession's ideology, but to broadly educate students in a
crucial area of legal affairs.
My tentative support for mandating this course arises partly out of a
larger curriculum debate about mandatory versus elective approaches
generally. The debate has been between the "choice" camp and the
"core" camp. Choice has some obvious advantages. Specialization in law
is a reality and students should be free to explore the subjects they feel
might interest them. Choice may correlate with better learning in the
sense that we are often more motivated when we study what we want to,
rather than when we study what we have to. Choice avoids a degree of
paternalism and domination of faculty over students. Choice avoids to a
degree the ideological misrepresentation that may arise from labelling
some courses "core" and others not. Choice asserts that it is impossible to
rationally argue for what should be in the core and what should not.
61. See M.J. Kelly, Legal Ethics and Legal Education, (The Hastings Centre, 1980), note 5
at 55-56.
62. Stuart C. Goldberg, "1977 National Survey on Current Methods of Teaching Professional
Responsibility in American Law Schools" in Teaching ProfessionalResponsibility, supra, note
3 at 21.
63. Cotter survey, supra, note 50, Q. 4(a), and Q. 18.
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In Manitoba, the debate has been shifted somewhat by redefining the
issue as one of "open choice" versus "balanced choice," rather than only
as "choice" versus "core." Choice may still be preserved within a
grouping of courses - perspective, clinical, and doctrinal, for example,
but you may still require students to choose a number of courses from
each grouping so as to achieve a more balanced educational objective.
The eclectic curriculum of mostly free student choice in course
selection after the first year was originally viewed as a way of broadening
legal education and opening up the development of more interdiscipli-
nary perspective courses and clinical offerings. In this regard, we did a
study in Manitoba of the students' selection of second and third-year
courses in the graduating classes of 1981 and 1982.64 All courses were
roughly divided into three camps: doctrinal, perspective and clinical. The
results of the study indicated that almost a third of the students never
elected to take any perspective courses in second or third year and
another third of the students took only one during their last two years of
law school. This means that in our elective system the vast majority of
students never take Jurisprudence, Legal History, Comparative Law,
Law and Economics, Legal Profession, or other "perspective" courses,
but rather take almost exclusively doctrinal courses and one or more
clinical courses that are perceived as being more "practical." Thus, legal
education is overwhelmingly unbalanced. Rather than broadening out to
study the more fundamental nature of law in society, legal education
becomes focused on a narrow view of what is vocationally relevant. Thus
the eclectic curriculum backfires.
Free choice may be "free" only superficially. Some students tell me
that they would have liked to take Comparative Law "or whatever," but
took Estate Planning "or whatever" instead, for fear of being
disadvantaged in getting an articling position. The eclectic curriculum just
translates into informal conformity with misperceptions of professional
relevance..
In Manitoba the balance camp has temporarily won the victory. Our
new curriculum, implemented in 1986, will mandate more balance by
having students take a mixture of doctrinal, clinical, and perspective
courses in every year of law school. Choice of courses may still exist
within the categories, but a certain balance of courses is mandated. Thus
a middle ground can be found between the choice camp and the core
camp by looking to balance. However, we admittedly did add to the
"core" by mandating certain courses such as "Interviewing, Counselling
64. Philip Osborne, "A Study of Student Selection of Second and Third Year Courses: The
Graduates of 1981 and 1982," June 1983, on file with the author.
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and Negotiation," in second year and, since 1983, "The Legal Profession
and Professional Responsibility" in the third year and several doctrinal
courses in second year.65 In Manitoba, then, the degree of choice has been
constrained and a movement back to core and balance has taken place.
Five years ago this would not have been possible, but the "choice" camp
has lost ground, which I believe is a general ideological trend not
confined to Manitoba. It is within this general trend to a coherent
curriculum rather than to an eclectic one that I support a mandatory
course in the Legal Profession in second or third year.
While I support mandating the course, ironically my own experience
with the movement from elective to mandatory has not been very
satisfactory, largely due to class size. In making the course compulsory,
Alberta has been able to offer six sections of the course with a maximum
of 25 students per section. In Manitoba, however, we only have two
sections of the course with around 45 students per section. We admit only
about 90 students per year and obviously in the larger enrollment schools
the movement to a compulsory course would require much more
substantial resource allocations than in Manitoba. In Manitoba a class of
45 is considered very large, while in some schools this would be
considered a "small group." Despite the relativity of the matter, however,
when the course was elective in Manitoba a small group of students
ranging from approximately 10-25 in any given year would enroll. This
small size enhanced discussion and except for one "off year," I felt quite
satisfied with the dynamics of the class and I interpreted the student
feedback as largely positive as well. With compulsion the class size
increased to 45, requiring a change in format from seminar to a lecture-
problem-discussion mix that has not as yet worked very well, in my
opinion. But the student and instructor satisfaction rate is down. Other
factors may be at work, of course. As well as instructor "burnout," there
may be a considerable difference between the motivations and
expectations of students who are concerned about ethics and are asking
themselves the questions about how to make lawyering an expression of
their deepest commitments and thus choose to take the course, versus
some who will now take the course simply because they have to.
However, this cost of compulsion must be weighed with the benefits of
having all students exposed to the course rather than only 20-25 percent
of them. While I support mandating the course, given the need for
participation and engagement, compulsion should not be purchased at
65. Curriculum Review Committee, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba, Report on a
New Curriculum, June 1983. The first year of the new curriculum came into effect in 1986-
87.
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the price of pedagogical ineffectiveness in terms of class size. It may not
be worth it.
ii. Materials?
Despite the proliferation of courses on professional responsibility and the
legal profession in Canada, there is still no formally published textbook
or materials book for the course and Canadian scholarship in the field is
almost non-existent.66 We thus have a long way to go before the course
is placed on a solid base of scholarship. It is partly the lack of critical
Canadian scholarship that is to blame for the narrow approach taken to
the teaching of the subject.
Particularly after the course was made mandatory for accreditation,
scholarship in the field exploded in the United States. There are at least
17 formally published course/casebooks available for the course in the
United States,67 and scholarly articles and books on the legal profession
and ethics are pouring off the presses.68 There is thus a dynamic
normative and empirical scholarly debate going on in the field. Because
of Canada's much smaller pool of scholars and publishing market, we
cannot expect the same volume of scholarship, but we should still expect
a lot more than currently exists. A great deal of the American material
can of course be utilized in our courses, but we need to critically study
our own patterns of legal services, our own governance and disciplinary
systems, our own conventional ethical practices and our own ideological
assumptions. Why is this not happening and what should be done about
it?
66. Mention should be made, however, of R. Evans and M. Trebilcock, Lawyers and the
Consumer-Interes (Butterworths, 1982), and the now dated book by Orkin, Legal Ethics
(1957). There are also a few Canadian materials on specific issues. For a review of the
Canadian scholarship, see Arthurs, Weisman, and Zemans, The Canadian Legal Profession,
[1986] A.B.E Res. J. 447.
67. Aronson, Devine, and Fisch, Professional Responsibility, 1985; Bellow and Moulton,
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 1981; Countryman, Finman, and Schneyer, The
Lawyer in Modem Society, 1976; Dvorkin, Himmelstein and Lesnick, Becoming A Lawyer,
1981; Hazard and Rhode, The Legal Profession, 1985; Kaufman, Problems in Professional
Responsibility, 2nd ed, 1984; Mathews, Problems Illustrative of the Responsibility of Members
of the Legal Profession, 1976; Mellinkoff, Lawyers and the System of Justice; Cases and Notes
on the Profession of Law, 1976; Morgan and Rotunda, Professional Responsibility, Problems
and Materials, 3rd ed., 1984; L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics: The Law of Professional
Responsibility, 2nd. ed., 1984; Pirsig and Kirwin, Professional Responsibility, Cases and
Materials, 4th ed., 1984; Redlich, Problems in Professional Responsibility, 2nd ed., 1983;
Schwartz and Wydick, Problems in Legal Ethics, 1983; Murray L. Schwartz, Lawyers and The
Legal Profession, 2nd ed., 1985; Thurman, Phillips, and Cheatham, Cases on the Legal
Profession, 1970; Gillers and Dorsen, Regulation of Lawyers, 1985; Shaffer, American Legal
Ethics: Tex Readings, and Discussion Topics, 1985.
68. See supra, note 25.
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I would suspect from the lack of scholarly attention to the field that
most teachers of professional responsibility do not treat it as their primary
scholarly interest. They toil in a different field. Yet without scholarly
commitment to the field of professional ethics we will not move out of
the narrow role morality and legalistic approaches to the subject.
One step that should be taken is the formation of a new section of the
Canadian Association of Law Teachers. C.A.L.T. holds a conference
yearly in which scholars in various subsections deliver papers and
informally get to know one another and discuss the field. The fact that the
vast majority of law schools offer a course in professional responsibility
and some may have several professors involved, suggests that a C.A.L.T.
subsection is overdue.69 If teachers in the field would get together,
perhaps some new scholarly efforts would be stimulated and even larger
co-operative works undertaken. In addition, the field would be given
higher visibility and legitimacy in Canadian legal education and
scholarship.
Another step worth pursuing is a separate national conference on the
teaching of the legal profession and professional responsibility in Canada.
A well planned conference would not only stimulate scholarly papers but
would bring together law professors, Bar Admission teachers,
professional ethicists and lawyers interested in the field. This too is long
overdue in Canada
Another step would be the establishment of a Canadian legal
profession research institute. This idea came to me during my term for
four years as a Bencher of the Law Society of Manitoba. It struck me then
that despite the good intentions and sacrificial giving of time by the
Benchers in governing the profession, the policy decisions involving
critical questions like advertising, specialization, fees, legal aid,
reimbursement policy, competency problems and professional
disciplinary problems and the like, were being made on an ad hoc
superficial, impressionistic basis with very little reference to any
systematic and coherent study of the problems. The governance of the
profession deserves more attention than that. In my view, we need a well
funded research institute, perhaps affiliated with a university, undertaking
a wide range of interdisciplinary research on the role of lawyers in
society, the quality and accessibility of legal services, the governance and
ethics of the profession, and so forth. Given that the legal profession plays
a pervasive role in society, touching on almost all aspects of human
69. This has now been accomplished. The first meeting took place at the C.A.L.T. conference
in Winnipeg, May 1986, and the second took place in Hamilton, May 1987.
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relations in some way or other, research into the ideology, structure, and
workings of the profession is needed and is in the public interest. I would
hope that such an institute, operating with both a full-time staff of
researchers and support from legal scholars in law schools and in the
profession, would stimulate research and writing. An institute could
sponsor conferences on issues facing the profession, circulate studies to
the law societies and government departments who have the power to
affect change, build a resource library on studies in the field from other
countries, publish a special journal on the legal profession, and support
pilot projects, much as the American Bar Foundation does.
If these steps were taken alongside the mandating of the course in law
school, then some hope for the scholarly development of the field is
possible.
iii. Qualifications?
Who is qualified to teach the course? This question deeply troubles me
because I do not currently practice law, but rather devote my time to
bearing a legal academic, a role that I ordinarily think is a very important
one in the legal system. But in the teaching of professional responsibility
I do feel defensive about my status and the lack of credibility that it gives
me with students. There must be advantages to having a teacher with
substantial experience in practice, because the subject involves having
much more perspective than can be gained from published codes, cases
and commentaries found in the library. I deal with this partly by having
several panels of practicing lawyers come to the class and debate a series
of problems that I have set on various topics. I also deal with it partly on
the belief that the course in the legal profession does not stand alone, but
should feed into the teaching of professional responsibility in the clinical
setting. Still I am troubled. There are some arguments to be made in my
favour, perhaps. The main one is that the perspective of a relative outsider
is important, after all. To step outside the role of lawyer may lead one to
see with more clarity some of the ethical difficulties that those inside the
role may be blind to. In addition, being an outsider may allow for an
easier identification with the interests of clients and third parties and the
general public affected by the behaviour of lawyers. But I am still
troubled, so I turn to the idea that we are really dealing with applied
ethics and thus ethical theory and moral reasoning become central.
However, this only compounds the trouble because, while I am a legal
academic, I may not be academic enough, in the sense that I am not
formally trained as an ethicist in either philosophy or theology. I thus fit
nicely in the classic problem of law professors being "divided against
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themselves, ' 70 being neither sufficiently practice-oriented not sufficiently
scholarly.
The Hastings Centre Report on the Teaching of Ethics and Higher
Education states:
71
Ideally, undergraduate programs should have introduced students to ethics
so that courses at the professional school level would have a base upon
which to build. As a practical matter that is too rarely the case. Hence,
courses at the professional school level will ordinarily have to do double
duty: provide students with the elements of ethical theory while, at the
same time, exposing them to the kinds of moral problems they will
encounter as professionals.
Daniel Callahan, the Director of the Hastings Centre, has squarely raised
the qualifications issue:
72
Whatever the shortcomings of, say, a training in philosophical, or
theological ethics, that training may be expected to provide some well-
established criteria for the assessing and justifying of moral arguments, and
some body of developed theory to provide a grounding for applied ethics;
there are disciplinary standards of rigor and quality. Enthusiasm, good
will, and interest are not sufficient qualifications for teaching courses in
organic chemistry, microeconomics or Greek literature. There is no reason
why they should be thought sufficient for the teaching of ethics, a difficult
subject with a long history.
What, then, would count as adequate qualification? I want to reject at the
very outset that form of disciplinary chauvinism which contends that only
those with advanced degrees in moral philosophy or moral theology are
properly qualified. That is correct in only one respect; they, and only they,
are properly qualified to teach courses that fall entirely within their own
disciplines. But the matter is very different for the teaching of applied and
professional ethics. It is at that point that the field becomes, of necessity,
inter-disciplinary, requiring knowledge both of ethics and of the other field
or fields to be analyzed from an ethical perspective. It is ethics and law,
ethics and biology, ethics and journalism, and so on. A person trained
exclusively in ethics will not be fully qualified to teach such courses; other
knowledge will have to be acquired. Yet, by the same token, someone
trained in a discipline other than ethics can become qualified to teach
ethics, if, in addition to training in his or her own field, he or she acquires
the necessary ethical training...
Callahan then outlines the concept of becoming a "competent amateur"
70. See Bergen, Law Teacher, A Man Divided Against Himself (1968), 54 Virginia L. Rev.
637.
71. Hastings Centre Report, The Teaching of Ethics in HigherEducation (1980) at 33.
72. Daniel Callahan, "Qualifications for the Teaching of Ethics" in Callahan and Bok, eds.,
Ethics Teaching in Higher Education (1980) at 76-77.
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in another discipline. Even if law professors who teach ethics do not
formally achieve a degree in moral philosophy they should spend at least
a year of formal education in that field, suggests Callahan. The alternative
is team-teaching the course on professional ethics. But finding the
resources to join the law professor and the moral philosopher together in
a course is difficult, and finding two people from different fields who
really work as a team is difficult.
The reality is that we need to infuse the field of legal ethics with moral
theory and reasoning and get away from arid legalism, yet most law
professors teaching the course are not formally trained in ethics, even as
"competent amateurs." I am certainly not, and law schools are not
particularly into promoting release time for re-training in different
disciplines. So the qualifications problem is compounded on two sides -
I do not have substantial experience in practice nor do I have formal
training in ethics.
While I am tempted at this stage to simply pull out, until someone
comes along with adequate qualifications, something must be done.
There is a growing body of literature on applied ethics by moral
philosophers than can be utilized73 and perhaps self-awareness about the
knowledge one lacks may prevent a degree of dogmatism in the
classroom. Still, I'm very troubled.
In the end I take some comfort in the fact that the moral reasoning
approach in relational context should not be seen as exclusively drawing
on moral philosophy as a scholarly discipline for the intellectual
framework of the course, though I believe it is important to do so to a
degree. There are many other scholarly disciplines to draw on that
foundationally deal with personhood, community and values. After all,
the focus of the approach is on the moral point of view we take as
persons. Even if we are trained moral philosophers, we may have
interests in theology, history, literature, sociology, or whatever. Most
importantly, we also have our own lives to draw on.74
iv. Methodology?
How you teach something depends on what you are trying to teach.
Aside from the different approaches to the subject, there is an even more
basic preliminary issue of defining the overall field of inquiry. One of my
frustrations has been how much time to spend on the legal profession
generally, and how much time to spend on more specific professional
73. See supra, note 25.
74. This point is well made by Elkins in the review essay, The Reconstruction of Legal Ethics
asEthics (1986), 36 J. of Legal Ed. 274.
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ethics issues. The law school at Queen's offers two courses, one on the
"legal profession" and one on "legal ethics and professional
responsibility. 75 Perhaps to do any kind of justice to both sides of the
subject matter, the Queen's approach of having two courses makes sense.
However, in other schools with only one course, the emphasis, perhaps
illustrated by the title,76 will vary. Methods of teaching will vary between
and within the courses as you shift from one area to another. Some
material is more descriptive and can be approached by lecture/
discussion. Some material is primarily normative and thus more serious
methodological problems arise. I personally find it easier to teach the
issues involving the legal profession generally, such as cost, equality, and
quality of legal services, for example, because various approaches,
including the sociological, provide a solid intellectual framework for the
discussion.
If we move away from a concentration on the role morality and
lawyer's law approaches and attempt to actualize the moral reasoning in
relational context approach, how do we do so? In addition to the
problem of lack of support from the law school environment, relative
lack of scholarly materials, and a perceived lack of qualifications, there is
also the problem of methodology.
Obviously, if a lawyer's law approach is primarily adopted for the
content of the course, then the teaching method will likely conform to
traditional approaches in doctrinal courses. Some combination of
lectures, discussions and socratic interchange based on the readings of
codes and cases will likely be the methodology. However, if a "personal
moral reasoning" approach is taken, more appropriate methods to fit that
content are required.
Can we utilize the case method in teaching moral reasoning? One of
the difficulties with a concentration on published cases is the "worst case"
syndrome. To illustrate issues of professional responsibility by reading
cases where lawyers have been disciplined or sued may give the
impression that we are concerned about the bottom line of staying out of
disciplinary trouble. But most of the genuine moral dilemmas of the
profession are not illustrated in "worst cases" where often the behaviour
of the lawyers involved was obviously unethical. We need problems and
illustrations involving the need to make decisions about what the "best",
or the "better" thing to do is.
Many American casebooks are built on the problem method rather
than the case method.77 Each chapter has a number of hypothetical
75. Cotter survey, supra, note 50.
76. Id, Q. 2.
77. Supra, note 67.
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problems to be discussed in class and then there are court cases or articles
or other illustrative materials that relate to the topic of the chapter. The
problems then may be used as the "situations" for the application of
moral reasoning by the teacher and students. As we shall note in the next
subsection, the teaching of professional responsibility in the clinical
setting is perceived as far superior to other methods because the students
are actively engaged in real situations, while the problem method in a
course in professional responsibility involves only hypotheticals.
Hypotheticals obviously have limitations as students can easily become
disengaged from them or fail to be honest in their responses. However,
the weakness in my view of the problem method is not so much the
inherent limitation of hypotheticals as much as the general failure to give
students some intellectual resources aside from their own intuition and
common sense with which to approach problems in the first place.
I have always attempted to use the problem method in some of the
course by going over a collection of problems on a topic in class and then
later having a panel of lawyers going over the same problems in a later
class. The students are in a much better position to be either affirmative
or critical of the lawyers' responses during the panel discussion if they
have first tackled and discussed the problems themselves. This "double
examination" approach has been a very successful way to utilize
practitioners in the course without sliding into conventional war stories.
However, the lack of any coherent approach to the analysis of ethical
problems has been very apparent in my class. Student A says X, student
B says Y, and student C says Z, and the instructor prods a little for more
clarification of the difficulties. How various interests may be affected by
the consequences of deciding one way rather than another may be
clarified, but without some more general ethical theory, the weight to be
given to the interests is simply left to personal opinion. To move away
from pure consequentialism and argue prima facie moral duties is an
even more tenuous enterprise. Thus, the problem method without more
does not lead to a deeper understanding and appreciation of moral
reasoning. We need to examine different theories of professional ethical
decision-making that provide frameworks in which problems can be
dissected and discussed.
The most promising development in the methodology of teaching the
professional responsibility course as a course in personal ethics is Thomas
Shaffer's use of lawyer stories, which he organizes around four different
moral points of view or paradigms of professional ethics.78 In addition to
78. T. Shaffer, American Legal Ethics: Test Readings, and Discussion, (Matthew Bender,
1985).
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the many stories in his coursebook, Shaffer's students also read four
novels that have lawyer protagonists and view some films involving
lawyers.79 Even if Shaffer's book does not easily transport into the
Canadian setting, I think the approach is extremely promising as a vehicle
that drives the students into the depths of their own vision of what they
are and want to be as persons and lawyers. As I try to cover more topics
and include more of the ever expanding law of lawyering in my course.
I find that I move away from the fundamental overall quest of how to
become a good person and a lawyer in a legal system that may be
bordering on the demonic. Should I at least tell students my own story?
Should they reveal their stories? Perhaps something real would happen in
such a conversation, something that weighs more than all the codes and
cases we could study. But why am I so afraid to "get personal" with my
students?80
The topic of methodology cannot be discussed, however, without
raising the problem of indoctrination. I view the ideal goal of a teacher
in a professional responsibility course to be that of helping students to
understand the multiple value questions arising in professional practice,
to understand the different ethical approaches to problems, and to
understand more profoundly the meaning of their own personal life in the
law. I would hope that this process would make a difference to the
decisions and actions ultimately made by the students, but my task is not
to change behaviour per se. Our task is not to indoctrinate our own or the
conventional values but rather to educate.81 While instructor bias to some
degree is inevitable and we should be open about what we personally
believe, we should not use the classroom to attempt to socialize a person
into conformity with particular practices. Professor May states:82
I propose that the essential task of the applied ethics teacher is what might
be called "corrective vision".., it implies that ethics in the classroom has
as its primary and direct intention not the bending of the will, the stirring
of the feelings, or the manipulation of behaviour, but the illumination of
the understanding. It is directed to insight and vision.
79. See Shaffer, Teacher's Guide, (Matthew Bender, 1985).
80. It may be that my fear stems from the perception that my own story is so radically
different. I grew up in a Mennonite "colony" where the norms of nonresistance and lifestyle
separation from the world dictated the view that you could not be a Christian and a lawyer.
I have moved away from this position, but my world view is still solidly wrapped up in
Anabaptist Christian faith, and my primary interest is how Biblical and theological study
illuminates law and legal practice.
81. See R. Macklin, "Problem in the Teaching of Ethics: Pluralism and Indoctrination" in
Ethics Teaching in Higher Education, supra, note 72 at 81.
82. W. May, 'Trofessional Ethics: Setting, Terrain and Teacher" in Ethics Teaching in Higher
Education, supra, note 72 at 240.
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In 1940, Brainard Currie wrote a marvelous paper on what the legal
profession course should be about. Unfortunately, the paper was never
published until someone found it and anonymously sent it to a journal in
1969. Back in 1940, Currie expressed the educational goals of the course
in a way that I believe has rarely been improved on:
8 3
It is, pre-eminently and above all else in this field, the duty of a university
law school to help its students to understand the significance of the
lifework they have undertaken; to see the ultimate purpose of a lawyer's
work; to discuss with him the function of law administration in society,
and the part in the administration of law which is played by the legal
profession, and the part which will be his as a member of the profession.
It is the duty of the law school to help him to adjust himself to his new
role, to find satisfaction in it, to orient himself, to see its challenge and its
limitations, to discover the ways in which, through it, he can find the
means of developing and expressing his own talents and his own
personality. This is education. This is not police work, conditioning men
against prohibited conduct; it is not training for yeoman service in
patrolling the preserves in the traditional manner of the guild. So far as
personal conduct is concerned it will raise men above rules, and induce
them to form precepts of their own, sanctioned only by their own integrity.
So far as the labors of the bar associations are concerned it will, let it be
admitted frankly, lead men to despise some of the existing policies as self-
serving pseudo-moralities which do not advance the administration of
justice and the public interest.
Such a plan involves the study of the legal profession, butfrom the outside,
and with the emphasis on the individual. The lawyer and his work, the
organized bar and its problems, should be regarded as if by a sociologist
or an anthropolgist, and always in relation to the ultimate function of law.
The consideration should be sympathetic, of course, but entirely devoid of
the complacent narcissism which too often accompanies the bar's self-
appraisals. The ultimate hope would be to lead the student to a devotion
to the higher principles of his calling, to an enthusiasm for its
opportunities, and to a faith in the worth-whileness of devoting his life to
its pursuit; to inspire him with a desire, not simply to be an ethical lawyer,
but to pour out all his energies and talents in living the kind of life he
wants to live, and living it through the law.
I am convinced, however, that faith - the kind that sticks, and consists of
more than naive acceptance of the beliefs of others - comes through
doubtNo amount of eulogistic oratory, glossing over the imperfections of
law and the ambiguity of the lawyer's position in certain situations, will do
more than temporarily suppress the lurking doubt in the student's mind as
to the possibility of fully reconciling law and living. I know of only one
way to remove it: it must be brought to the surface, recognized, aired,
analyzed, and its causes traced; and then the facts relating to these causes
83. Brainerd Currie, Reflections on the Course on the Legal Profession (1969), 22 J. of Legal
Ed. 48 at 55-56.
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must be carefully and honestly examined so that the cdifficulty can be
explained away if possible, or at least isolated and identified. If the legal
profession is really worth the lives these students propose to devote to it,
it will be able to withstand such an examination. No man should ask that
the pattern of his life should be perfect. It should be enough if he can see
in its plan the imperfections which he wants to avoid and the points at
which he will want to fight for improvement.
v. Evaluation?
Only one course in this field in Canada is currently marked by pass/fail,
while the others are graded, often by some combination of final
examination, term paper and classroom participation.84 The need to
grade is sometimes seen as less a matter of evaluation than a matter of
motivation. Without grading, students may treat the course less seriously
than they do other courses. But evaluation does pose some problems that
are heightened in this course. What is the message to potential employers
if a student receives a "C" in the ethics course or even a failure as
compared to a student who receives an "A' or a "B+"? The problem is
that personal integrity is not being directly evaluated at all (if that were
possible). A "C" student may have written a lousy paper while the "'"
student wrote a very good one. The "A" student may, however, be a
person whom I would not personally trust as a lawyer while I may have
a great deal of confidence in the integrity of the "C" student. Thus, I find
evaluation painful for fear that the mark will be utilized by others in a
wrongful way. The pass/fail distinction avoids some of the degrees of this
problem but still poses the difficulty of ever failing anyone.
The problem of what we are evaluating arises as well. In papers and
examinations we must obviously be careful not to reward those who we
agree with and penalize those who we do not agree with. I generally look
for how well the student has identified the issues and how well the
student has analyzed and evaluated the competing approaches utilizing
both conventional sources of professional ethical norms and also moral
reasoning generally. In this sense, I do not think that evaluation is really
more difficult than in other courses. What is important is that evaluation
should be understood for what it is and not be blown into something it
is not. A person may have a high degree of moral knowledge and
reasoning skill, but I do not believe that this necessarily translates into
moral action. To know the right is not necessarily to do it.
(c) Teaching Professional Responsibility in the Clinical Courses
It is now orthodox to view clinical education as the best method of
84. Cotter Survey, supra, note 50, Q. 7 and 8.
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teaching professional responsibility.85 While I believe that clinical legal
education is an essential aspect of the law school curriculum, I take the
unorthodox position that clinical education should not be seen as
obviously superior to a separate course on the legal profession and
professional responsibility, but rather that the clinical and course
experience should be coordinated and coequal. The reason for this
position is that despite the potential advantages of the clinical setting,
there are also problems that reduce the likelihood that professional
responsibility will be adequately taught in such a setting alone. To make
my limited point about affirming the value of the separate course in
coordination with a clinical course, I wish to only briefly summarize both
the promise and the problems of the clinical setting in teaching
professional responsibility. The summary nature of these comments
should not be taken to imply that the clinical setting is less important than
a separate course, but rather that I simply do not have the experience to
give a more expansive treatment to this topic here.
Compared to reasoning with abstract hypotheticals, engaging in actual
lawyering experience under supervision and critical reflection is indeed
potentially a very effective setting for teaching professional responsibility.
The value questions arising from the inter-personal relationships involved
in lawyering; the value questions arising out of the techniques of the
lawyering process; and the value questions arising out of experiencing
certain legal institutions and processes firsthand; all become real to the
student. Motivational difficulties are largely absent as the student must
take personal responsibility and be accountable for decisions made.
Moral tensions of the lawyering role are thus experienced directly by the
student, and experience in a way that engages the whole person, both
emotionally and intellectually. Moral reasoning and discussion can take
place within the context of facing all the real constraints and situational
85. See, H.R. Sacks, Student Fieldwork as a Technique in Educating Law Students in
Professional Responsibility (1968), 20 J Legal Ed. 291; H.R. Sacks, Remarks on Involvement
and Clinical Training (1968), 41 U. of Col. L. Rev. 452; L. Brickman, Contributions of
Clinical Programs to Training for Professionalism (1971-72), 4 Conn. L. Rev. 437; R.E. Bird,
The Clinical Defence Seminar. A Methodology for Teaching Legal Process and Professional
Responsibility (1974), 14 Santa Clara Lawyer 246; W. Pincus, One Man's Perspective on
Ethics and the Legal Projession (1974-75), 12 San Diego L. Rev. 279; B. Cooke and J. Taylor,
Developing Personal Awareness and Examining Values: Interconnected Dimensions of
Supervision in Clinical Legal Education (1978), 12 U.B.C.L. Rev. 276; N. Gold, Legal
Education, Law and Justice: The Clinical Experience (1979-80), 44 Sask. L. Rev. 97; M.
Meltsner and P. Schrag, Report From a CLEPR Colony (1976), 76 Columb. L. Rev. 581; G.M.
Tuoni, Teaching Ethical Considerations in the Clinical Setting: Professiona Personal and
Systemic (1981), 52 U. of Colorado L. Rev. 409; S.H. Leleiko, Love, Professional
Responsibility and Clinical Legal Education (1980), 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 641; M. Jewell,
TeachingLaw Ethically: Is It Possible? (1984), 8 Dalhousie L. Jour. 474.
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factors that most hypothetical problems cannot ever duplicate in richness
and ambiguity of detail.
In addition, one dominant theory of how we learn to be virtuous
involves the primacy of action and experience over pure intellectual
knowledge. 86 Perhaps we know what is good by first doing and
experiencing good acts. Intellectual knowledge of what is good behaviour
and why, most often comes after the more unreflective and habitual
doing of good deeds, often by following the behaviour models of other
influential persons - parents or peers. Thus the development of moral
dispositions and character involves experiential learning, not just abstract
reasoning with hypothetical cases. Clinical legal education involves both
experiential learning in the context of the role model provided by the
lawyer/professors, and also the reflective critical examination of that
experience. Thus, the clinical experience appears to be the ideal setting
for critical reflection on the moral and emotional tension between role
morality and ordinary morality. Students for the first time are actually
experiencing the role adjustments of lawyering. Because much of the
focus of the course is on interpersonal skills (interviewing, counselling
and negotiation), the teaching of professional responsibility is less likely
to follow a narrow "lawyer's law" approach and more likely to examine
personal moral identity in the interactive context of lawyering.
Having said all this, however, the clinical setting as such is only a stage
on which the activity of teaching professional responsibility must be
played out. That the setting has tremendous potential in this regard for
the players does not guarantee that they will perform in this area.87 The
play may well take many different forms because clinical education has
several goals. The primary focus of clinical course will likely be on the
teaching of certain lawyering skills that traditional legal education has
ignored. This in itself is very important, and indeed, given that
competence is a matter of ethics, the clinical component of the
curriculum in this sense already advances professional responsibility. Any
clinical program that is worthy of inclusion in the curriculum will give
attention to the supervision and analysis of student activity so that
methods of self-criticism and reflection on performance will develop and
continue in professional life. It is because lawyering skills can be learned
86. See Thomas Lickona, "What Does Moral Psychology Have to Say to the Teacher of
Ethics?" in Ethics Teaching in Higher Education, supra, note 72 at 103; David Luban,
Epistemology and MoralEducation (1983), 33 J. of Legal Ed. 636.
87. See K. Hegland, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy (1982), 32 J. of Legal Ed.
69; Robert Condlin, "The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education" in The Good Lawyer,
supra, note 25 at 317; Steven Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach
TrialAdvocacy (1987), 37 J. Leg. Ed. 123.
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in the context of being exposed to a growing analytic and psychological
literature on the dynamics of the skills, of having critical feedback on
performance, and on having the time to coherently reflect on
performance, that makes clinical education a legitimate alternative to
simply dumping students into apprenticeship after law school. The
potential problem, however, for the teaching of professional responsibil-
ity in this setting is that the focus on skills does not inherently translate
into a critical focus on values. The focus on skills may be central and
professional responsibility per se peripheral. Indeed, it may simply be that
students are taught how to be better manipulators of people, how to be
better assassins in the courtroom, how to start the process of emotionally
separating the person from the professional role. This is to say that
clinical legal education in the name of skills training may place
instrumental technique analysis in the position where it swallows critical
moral examination of the use of the techniques in the first place, I think
this temptation is greater in the clinical setting than it is in the separate
course. As Robert Condlin has put it, "practising law is not the same as
critically understanding law practice." 88
I am not saying that this moral failure in fact happens in every clinical
course because when you examine some leading course materials in the
clinical setting you actually find some of the most sophisticated writings
on professional responsibility to be found anywhere.8 9 However, the
focus on skills training within the context of assumption of professional
role can easily lead to socialization and even indoctrination in particular
styles of lawyering, particularly conventional ones, and this danger is
more acute precisely because the setting is such a powerful pedagogical
tool. All I am suggesting is that the teaching of professional responsibility
in the clinical setting must be grounded in ethical theory and be open to
sophisticated moral reasoning and literature on professional role
ideology, instead of having professional responsibility concerns simply
tacked on in an ad hoc way to the primary concern with technique for its
own sake. Until clinical legal education puts professional responsibility
teaching as the purpose of the course, rather than just one of eight or nine
other legitimate objectives, I do not think we should see it as an
alternative to the separate course. In addition, even if a clinical course
does consider moral concerns to be as equally foundational as skills
88. Robert Condlin, Tastes Grea4 Less Filling: The Law School Clinic and Political Critique
(1986), 36 J. of Legal Ed. 45 at 77.
89. Particularly G. Bellow and G. Moulton, The Lawyering Process, (Foundation Press,
1978). Also the paper by S.R. Ellis, Parkdale Community Services: Its Clinical Education
Aspec'An Analysis (1979), C.A.L.T. Conference in Saskatoon.
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training, the range of ethical issues may be limited by the context of the
particular field of law or clientele involved in the clinical setting.
Perhaps then, the most promising approach to the teaching of
professional responsibility would be coordinating the separate course and
the clinical course in such a way that students could utilize their actual
experience in the clinic to bring alive the comprehensive treatment of the
subject given in a separate course, and equally bring to the clinical
experience the perspectives gained in the separate course. Mandating the
separate course as we have done in Manitoba means that all the students
in the clinical program will take it. But some will take it before they take
the clinical course, some will take it at the same time, and some will take
it after they have had the clinical course. It might be better to tie the
clinical students into the separate course on professional responsibility so
that they take both at the same time. The more difficult problem is how
to actually achieve coordination between instructors. At minimum there
should be a sharing of materials and a basic understanding of what is
going on in both settings. Even better would be a willingness of
instructors to team up and participate to some degree in each other's
courses. Unfortunately, given the way that teaching duties are often
inflexibly allocated and measured, and given other institutional inter-
personal constraints, law schools do not regularly foster flexible
collaborative teaching. As much of legal practice involves the
collaboration of specialists, this lack of collaborative learning by students
and collaborative teaching and research by law professors amounts to a
serious educational deficiency in itself.
IV. Why Should We Teach?: Planted Between Cement and Putty
Despite all the difficulties that I have briefly canvassed in the last section,
I have still argued that this subject should be developed and made
mandatory. Yet there is a major hurdle that still must be jumped. We
must ask whether the teaching of professional responsibility at law school
is useful to anyone. Ideally we would like to think that legal education
impacts on the world of law. We would like to think that we contribute
in some way to the making of a more competent, more ethically
responsible, more helpful profession. Even if such collective impacts are
hard to believe in, we may ideally believe that at least particular
individuals have found in law school some vocational vision that has
propelled them into finding law work personally fulfilling rather than
profoundly frustrating. But can we think this?
The teaching of professional responsibility at law school can be
relegated to a low priority position, or even dismissed altogether, by the
argument that the course is useless. In short, the argument can be made
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that teaching professional responsibility does not matter in that very little,
if any, change in professional attitudes or behaviour results from students
having taken such a course. That it does not matter is partly supported by
evidence. In a survey of law students in several different schools,
Professor Pipkin studied law students' attitudes to the professional
responsibility course and discovered that such courses, "to a statistically
significant degree were perceived by students as requiring less time, as
being substantially easier, as less well taught, and as a less valuable use of
class time" in comparison to other courses. 90 The low status given by
students to courses in professional responsibility probably translates into
low influence on later professional decision-making. Similarly, Zemans
and Rosenblum studied the contribution of law schools to the
professional development of lawyers and how it compares with that of
other socializing agents and experiences by surveying more than 500
practicing lawyers in Chicago.91 On the issue of resolving questions of
professional responsibility, it is notable that the lawyers surveyed did not
grant much value to their having taken a course on professional
responsibility in law school. The influence of general upbringing and the
influence of co-workers were rated as far more important, as the
following results indicate:92
Rank Order of Sources Contributing to the Resolution of Questions of




General upbringing 61.6 17.5
Observation of or advice from other
attorneys in your law office 21.5 37.4
Law school consideration of these topics 11.0 19.6
Observation of or advice from other
attorneys not in your law office 1.7 14.6




The study also notes that lawyers who graduated from prestigious
national law schools rated the influence of their law schools on
90. Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular
Parado, [1979] A.B. Found, R.J. 247 at 258.
91. Zemans and Rosenblum, The Making of a Public Profession, (American Bar Foundation,
1981).
92. Id, at 172.
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professional responsibility issues as even less than lawyers who graduated
from non-prestigious regional schools. It is evidence such as this that
seriously puts to us the question, "Why should we bother to teach
professional responsibility?"
Neither Pipkin nor Zemans and Rosenblum are in fact cynical about
the potential for law school instruction in professional responsibility.
However, to oversimplify, a cynical position could easily be arrived at by
adopting either of two kinds of arguments about moral development and
socialization. I call these the "cement" theory on one hand and the
"putty" theory on the other.
The cement theory is the idea that the quality of professional
behaviour by a lawyer is determined by the moral character and
dispositions of that lawyer, and this disposition is cemented firmly in
place by the time the person goes to law school. Ethical analysis and
discussion in law school is useless because it cannot penetrate the
cemented moral character of the student. If there is a degree of moral
failure in the profession the law school can only contribute to prevention
by applying a moral screening device upon admission, rather than
attempting to teach professional responsibility. But moral screening in
itself is obviously fraught with extreme moral dangers and law schools
are not about to embark on it.
The putty theory, on the other hand, is the idea that the quality of
professional behaviour is not determined essentially by moral character
or moral reasoning, but rather by situational factors. The situation molds
the professional, who is like putty, so to speak, under its influence. And
the situation that counts is not law school, but the actual practice of law.
The "way things are done" within various fields of law, within different
firms, within different legal institutions and within various economic
constraints, determines how the lawyer will act. The ethical putty is
simply molded to the existing role expectations of whatever practice
situation the professional ends up in. Like the famous psychological study
on obedience to authority where people of "good moral character" on
command were willing to apply severe electrical shocks to a person 93, so
the lawyer of "good moral character" may under the right situational
pressures, act perversely. Instruction in professional responsibility at law
school may impact on the putty, but not in any permanent way, as legal
practice remolds the person into conformity with its own dynamics. As
93. S. Milgram, Behavioural Study of Obedience (1963), 67 Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology 371.
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Jerome Carlin, who in many ways pioneered the sociological study of the
legal profession94 suggests: 95
Law schools have tended to define the task of increasing professional
responsibility in the narrow sense of improving the ethics of the Bar.
Unethical practice was viewed as the problem. The source of the difficulty
vas located in the individual lawyer - something was defective in his
professional makeup. The solution was for the law school to instill in
prospective lawyers appropriate values and commitments. This has been
largely a fruitless enterprise because it assumes that professional norms and
values can be "internalized" during law school, and fruitless also because
it assumes that ethical conduct is determined mainly by the strength of the
lawyer's moral or ethical commitments. In fact, degree of conformity with
ethical standards is primarily a function of the pressures lawyers encounter
in their practice, pressures arising from the nature of their clients and the
relations they have with them, the kinds of courts and agencies with which
they come in contact and the nature of these involvements. There is,
moreover, a pattern to these pressures reflecting the power structure to the
Bar.
There have been those, who, like Carlin, in good faith have basically
adopted the cement or the putty theory, and thus question the value of
teaching professional responsibility in law school.96 It is more common,
however, for educators to adopt a different view, namely that moral
character, attitudes, thinking and behaviour are developmentaL Between
the importance of prior formation and the importance of future
situational pressures, there is the significant potential of law school to
influence students for good or ill as they form a vocational vision of what
law and legal practice can or should be. Some educators find both the
support for a moral development theory and the support for a specific
agenda for moral education in the work of Professor Lawrence
Kohlberg.97 However, for our purposes the basic point is that moral
development need not stop completely in the adult, however important
94. See Carlin, Lawyers On Their Own, (Rutgers Univ. Press, 1962); Lawyer's Ethics: A
Survey of the New York City Bar, (Russell Sage Found., 1966); and Civil Justice and the Poor
(Russell Sage Found., 1967).
95. Carlin, What Law Schools Can Do About Professional Responsibility (1971-72), 4 Conn.
L. Rev. 459 at 450.
96. See Graham Parker, The Teaching of Legal Ethics (1968), 1 Canadian Legal Studies 267;
Eugene Smith, Is Education for Professional Responsibility Possible? (1968), 40 U. of Col. L.
Rev. 509; Philip Shuchman, The Use of Empirical Data and Field Research for Teaching
Professionalism in Procedure Courses (1971-72), 4 Conn. L. Rev. 447.
97. See T. Willging and T. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Student Theory and
Data on Legal Education (1981), 31 J. of Leg. Ed. 306; David Richards, Moral Theory, The
Development Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism (1981), 31 J. of Leg. Ed.
359; Lickona, "What Does Moral Psychology Have to Say to the Teacher of Ethics?" in Ethics
Teaching in Higher Education, supra, note 72 at 103.
454 The Dalhousie Law Journal
upbringing may be in shaping the direction of growth. The analogy to a
plant may be appropriate. The ultimate potential for growth and final
shape may be determined by genetic predisposition and the place and
conditions of early growth, but significant flourishing or retardation is
possible by the presence or absence of water, tending, and sunshine. The
law school experience may also be a place of moral growth or
retardation, of sunshine or darkness, flourishing or stagnation, or
probably some combination of them.
Within this developmental view, it may be useful to summarize some
of the debate over the socializing effect of the law school experience
generally. If the law school does influence the growth of the moral
"plant" as it were, how should we interpret and view that influence?
There are numerous studies and opinions on the impact of the law
school experience on the values and attitudes of law students.98 Some
studies emphatically deny that significant value change occurs in law
school.99 However, a group of studies conclude that the law school
experience does foster change in student attitudes, but this change may be
interpreted as going in a negative direction. For example, Rathjen
surveyed the general orientation toward law work of law students at the
University of Tennessee. 1°° Rathjen tested students on their disposition to
view law work as being essentially part of an "enterpreneurial" model of
pursuit of individual client interests and rights in a market-like context of
conflict resolution and bargaining, or on the other hand, as viewing law
work as part of a "social welfare" model where law is an instrument for
social change and reflects wider group and societal interests. Rathjen
found significant shifts of outlook and commitment between first-year
students and third-year students in the direction toward the enterpreneur-
ial model and away from social reformist concerns. Thus support for the
view that law school dampens commitment to social reform and justice
may be found in Rathjen's study.
In another study, Katz and Denbaux administered an attitudinal
survey to law students at Seton Hall.10 ' Contrary to the assumption of
some that entering law students are already more cynical, less trusting of
people, and more manipulative than the average person of similar age,
98. For a summary of the studies up to 1977, see K. Barry and P. Connelly, Research on Law
Students: An Annotated Bibliography, [19781 Am. B.F.RJ. 751.
99. W. Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the Professional Ethics of
Law Students (1969), 21 J. of Legal Ed. 587; Willging and Dunn, supra, note 97.
100. G. Rathjen, The Impact of Legal Education on the Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values of Law
Students (1976-77), 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 85.
101. A. Katz and M. Denbeaux, Trus4 Cynicism, and Machiavellianism Among Entering
First- YearLaw Students (1975-76), 53 J. of Urb. Law 397.
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Katz and Denbaux found that this was not so. However, during the law
school experience there does seem to be an attitudinal shift away from
social idealism.102 But in another study, this time at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison Law School, Erlanger and Klegon cast doubt on the
assumption of significant value shifts in law school away from a "public
interest" law model and towards a "business" model.1 3 Their survey
indicated that there was indeed a political shift in a conservation direction
during law school, but the shift was not as significant in degree as most
earlier studies assumed. Finally, in a study at the University of Denver
Law School, Stover found that a shift away from reformist public interest
concerns in law school was noticeable in that legal education in content
and form may well influence law students in particular directions so as to
make decisions about what kind of law to practice and how.104
Attitudinal surveys thus far do not conclusively prove the shape of the
socializing effect, if any, of law school education. Still there are those that
would nevertheless assert that law school fails precisely because it does
not influence students significantly in the context where significant
potential for professional formation is possible. In a major study, focusing
more on the interpersonal side of lawyering, Shaffer and Redmount
criticize legal education for fostering narrow "legalistic" attitudes to law
practice rather than what might be broadly called "humanistic"
attitudes.105 They suggest that to be of genuine service to clients requires
of lawyers a "humanistic" disposition and interpersonal skills to actualize
that disposition. Genuine service to clients includes an empathetic
concern for how the client feels and what the client experiences and
expects. It includes the identification of the real needs of the client and the
taking of legal action or the foregoing of such action in reference to those
needs. Most lawyers are ministering to the needs of human beings,
dealing with hurt and threat and expectation and desire. They should be
expected to be reasonably concerned and personally helpful in dealing
with their clients. On this level, however, lawyers tend not to feel or care
about people, because lawyers narrowly seek legal answers with little
reference to the personal feelings of their clients, and little demonstrated
concern for what legal solutions do to people. The lawyer's method is to
abstract from the situation a pure "legal" solutions, and then to work
toward a chosen solution through the use of "legal" problem to be solved,
102. Unpublished speech by Katz and speech by Denbeaux at Detroit Conference, 1977.
103. H. Erlanger and D. Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional School (1978), 13 Law
& Society Rev. 11.
104. R. Stover, Law School and Professional Responsibility: The Impact of Legal Education
on Public Interest Practice (1982), 66 Judicature 194.
105. T. Shaffer and R. Redmount, supra, note 35.
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,then to formulate alternative "legal" solutions, and then to work toward
a chosen solution through the use of "legal" skills. The end of the process
may leave the lawyer with a sense of satisfaction but not necessarily leave
the client with any sense of having been helped, understood, or cared
about. Legal education is the ground from which this withered
antihumanistic professional orientation springs. It is in law school where
students learn not to be concerned for human experiences in the drive to
"think like a lawyer." The law school, in its curriculum, method of
teaching, and climate, reinforces in students a bias to intellectual
conceptualism, verbal aggression, and competitive manipulation, at the
expense of fostering emotive and moral understanding, collaborative
problem-solving and humane concern for people.
Shaffer and Redmount administered a sophisticated social science
survey to students at three law schools (Notre Dame, Valparaiso, and
Indianapolis) as well as to professors and practicing alumni from those
schools. By the use of an attitudinal survey and also through the study of
problem-solving behaviour in relation to three hypothetical cases, the
author's conclude that indeed the vast majority of law students,
professors, and lawyers are "tough-minded" rather than "tender-
hearted," are "problem-oriented" rather than "person-oriented," and
value traditional legal skills rather than skills like determining client
feelings and attitudes, formulating a client's problem in non-legal terms,
and determining the likely personal and social effect of legal intervention.
Through the study of classroom interchange and teaching methodology
the authors conclude that indeed legal education does not exhibit
"humanism" either.
The unexpected "twist," however, is that attitude and behaviour in
relation to "humanistic" concern does not change significantly from
entering law student, to second-term student, to senior student and finally
to practicing lawyer. In other words, the idea that law school significantly
changes disposition is refuted. Legal education does not change character
for better or worse, but rather the incoming law student is predisposed to
narrow intellectualism, which the law school simply reinforces.
While Shaffer and Redmount express surprise by this lack of law
school influence, most of their book, nevertheless, involves a severe
criticism of law school curriculum method, and climate. In their view,
law school should have an effective - a positive one, by the creation of
a learning climate in which human concern is predominant. Shaffer and
Redmount attempt to show that incoming students, while predisposed to
verbal aggression, competition and intellectualism, have another side, too
- concern for social justice, and professional interpersonal skill. This
side is not reinforced in law school but should be and can be. Thus, the
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law school experience may be seen as the process of watering and tending
some branches of the plant and not others.
We may conclude, more by experience and common assumption than
by empirical proof, that law students pick up a lot of value messages from
the informal and formal context of the law school experience. Most law
students, whatever their age and background and previous connections, if
any, to law and lawyers, essentially are embarking on a new and
intensely important vocational commitment by going to law school. It is
inevitable that some process of adjustment and growth in personal
identity must take place to accommodate the realities of the role of
becoming a lawyer. This identity formation, it seems to me, is very much
influenced by how the law school experience deals with law and
lawyering - what images and ideologies are presented to the students as
possibilities and ideals for the integration of self and professional role.
106
Without denying the importance of the existing self-identity that students
have before law school and the powerful influence on the person of
experiences in the practice of law, we may reasonably assume that the
law school experience does impact on the personal identity of students
and thus on what and how they practice. Still, the issue of why we should
teach professional responsibility is not satisfactorily answered, it seems to
me, by pointing out that such teaching can help socialize students for
good or ill, just as law school generally socializes students. A number of
other factors must be noted.
First, teaching professional responsibility is not a process of somehow
influencing those who do not have basic moral integrity into becoming
persons with such moral integrity. There will always be some lawyers
who will end up being disbarred for stealing from the trust funds or for
some other gross violation of professional duty. It may well be that the
law school, even if it tried, could not change a person who has a
fundamental lack of moral integrity or strength. But this is not the point.
The difficult and pervasive questions of professional ethics involve
considerations of what "good" people should do - what the best or the
better thing to do is, in situations of great complexity and ambiguity. The
teaching of professional responsibility is not premised on the question,
"How can a bad person be a lawyer?", but rather on the question, "How
can a good person be a lawyer?" The course should not be justified as
some means of training people to conform nicely with professional
standards, particularly minimal ones. Indeed, critical reflection on the
conventional role or practice of lawyers may prophetically call into
106. See Watson, supra, note 31; Elkins, Rites de Pssage;Law Students "Telling TheirLives"
(1985), 35 J. of Leg. Ed. 27.
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question the way things are, and thus be preceived as a threat, rather than
a help to the established bar.
Secondly, however interesting, there is a sense, which we embark on
the wrong path in focusing on law school socialization or on whether
training in professional responsibility is possible in terms of formation of
moral character. Do we even want to imagine law school as some
industrial process of taking "raw material" in at one end and spewing out
a "product" at the other end and evaluating this "product" in terms of our
criteria as to what proper attitudes and dispositions the product should
have? While value neutrality is a myth, we may still imagine that the
moral influence of law school should operate differently than in an army
boot camp. The goal of professional responsibility teaching is not to
coerce or manipulate into virtue but to expose students to the experience
and thoughts of people about this field of inquiry. I want to tell students
some of what I know, what I feel, and what I think. I also want students
to be exposed to the opinions of many others who have written in the
field about what they know, feel and think. I want students to engage,
evaluate and react to these opinions in coming to conclusions of their
own.
One of the few positive statements made by Jesus about the scribal
(scholarly/teacher) role is found in Matthew 13, Verse 52: "Therefore
every teacher of the law who has been instructed about the kingdom of
heaven is like the owner of a house who brings out of his storeroom new
treasures as well as old." We do not exercise authority to mold people or
set them on desirable paths, but rather we simply help bring to them
treasures both old and new, or more likely we help them to find the
treasures. What students do with those treasures is their decision. We
should perhaps look more substantively at whether it is really treasure we
are presenting, as opposed to straw or dung, and stop worrying so much
about effecting behavioural change. Dig for treasure, present it, and
somewhere it will be used by someone to enrich the world.
The treasure analogy is important to me because there are periods of
time each year where, unable to sleep, I sit in the family room in the
middle of the night and contemplate my life. Aside from being haunted
by the questions of whether I am a fraud, or whether I am moving
forward in knowledge or teaching ability, there is the recurring nightmare
that in the world of law I am simply wasting my life in law teaching.
Student evaluation forms may include some appreciative comments
directed to the instructor, but there is no letter or word, as yet, from some
former student who has practised for five years saying something like,
"The course you taught me really made a difference to how I practice
law." I fantasize that if I were practising law, feedback would be more
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direct. A client has a worthy goal or a need and I help the client achieve
or fulfill it. My involvement as a lawyer helps to structure or restructure
the world (hopefully for good rather than bad) often in very visible direct
ways. I recall how one of my own law teachers who was in practice
pointed to a new building and said, "I helped build that structure - got
development approval, structured and formalized the investment
offerings, did the construction contract and so forth." He said it like an
architect pointing out with satisfaction the aesthetic form and function of
his or her design. Similarly, I fantasize about the feeling of satisfaction
that might come from making an argument that I believed in to the
Supreme Court and having it adopted by the Court as binding precedent.
Even legal scholarship, despite the question of ultimate influence on the
world, has at least a small quality of satisfaction associated with it when
something you write is published and enters the intellectual marketplace.
The writing at least exists; it becomes real in the printing of the words.
But teaching seems to be like firing a gun backwards at a target while you
are permanently tied in a position where you never see the target to either
aim or know whether you are hitting it. Still, I must persuade myself
again that teaching law students is worthwhile and does matter somehow
and I go back to bed with the expectation of facing another class in the
morning. If it does not matter, why do I spend 80 percent of my time in
teaching preparation rather than concentrating on scholarship or
practice? Perhaps it does matter profoundly. It is not the life of power and
glory or fame and fortune, but the way of humble digging for the treasure
that speaks to the emergence of a more competent and responsible
profession in the service of human justice needs.
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APPENDIX
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Responses were received from all of Canada's law schools in 1984.
Updated responses were not received from all schools. The updating was
prepared on the assumption that old data from non-responding schools
was still accurate. In some cases the responses are greater or fewer than
the number of schools. In many cases respondents declined to answer
particular questions. In some cases, more than one respondent answered
on behalf of the law school.
These are unofficial results.
1. Does your school offer a course in Legal Ethics, Professional
Responsibility, the Legal Profession or the like?
No - 5: U. of Toronto
Ottawa (civil law side)
McGill
Universit6 de Moncton
University of Western Ontario
Yes - 14
2. If yes, what is the title of the course? (Note: Only those answering
Yes to question 1 (ie. 13 schools, 15 responses) are included in
question 2-23)
Professional Responsibility - 3
Legal Profession(s) - 6
Legal Ethics - 0
Law of Professional Conduct - 1
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility - 2
The Legal Profession and Professional Responsibility - 2
Professional Responsibility and the Profession of Law - 1
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Queen's (Legal Ethics) 5
Sherbrooke 4
Calgary 3
(b). What, if anything, was taught in this subject area before the
introduction of this course?
- "Nothing specific"
- "Don't know" - 2
- No answer - 2
- "Nothing" - 3
-"Very little"
- Legal Profession
- Responsibilit: Civile des Professionels
- "Course by course interstitial comment"
- "Covered in other courses"
"P.R. material part of other courses to some extent"
- "Individual non-credit lectures by bench and bar"
4(a). Is the course a requirement for graduation or is it an elective
course?
Required - 4 (Manitoba, Alberta, Calgary and Dalhousie
(effective 1988-89))
Optional - 10
(b). How many sections of the course are offered at your school?
One section - 9
Two sections - 3 (Manitoba, Queen's and Windsor)
Six sections - 1 (Alta.)
Seven sections - 1 (Dalhousie - 1988-89).
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Over 50 - 1
average = approximately 30
5. In which academic years and in which terms is the course offered?
[Note: All the offerings of the course(s) are included in these
results]
Fall term, first year - 0
Spring term, first year - 2
Fall term, second year - 7
Spring term, second year - 9
Fall term, third year - II
Spring term, third year - 13
6. How many hours per week (in one semester) are assigned to the
course?
Two hours - 6
Three hours - 1
(Calgary - 30 hours (1 week) in 1 term)
7. How is the course evaluated?
Graded - 13
Pass/Fail - 1 (Calgary)
8. What methods of evaluation are used?
- Final exam - 4
- Final exam, classroom performance and paper - 3
- Take-home exam and paper - 1
- Final exam and paper - 1
- Classroom performance - 1
- Take-home exam - 0
- Classroom performance, paper and - 1
leading a seminar
- Paper - 1
- Take-home exam, paper, classroom - 1
performance
- Final exam, take-home exam, classroom - 1
performance, paper
- Computer-aided exam - 1
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9. What teaching methods are used in the course? [Note: more than




Siminar discussions - 5
Class presentations by students - 3
Discussion of student papers - 1
10. What teaching materials are used in the course?
- Assigned readings (unspecified) - 7
- Casebook (unspecified) - 4
- Materials (specified)
- Arthurs, Mills & Starr (1984) - 2
- materials based on "Luban's Model - 1
Course"
- Codes and Handbooks - 11
11. Approximately what percentage of the course is
consideration of the following topics?


























C. Legal Obligations of Lawyers
0% - 4
15% - 2
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16-20% - 4
Over 20% - 1 (40%)















(two stated that all topics were
ethical in a broad way)
(stated that law teachers can't




E Other Responses Given:
Legislation and regulations governing the profession
Expos6 par les &udiants
Legal education
Socio-legal issues





































One year 2 8.7%
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Two years 1 4.3%
Three years 5 21.7%
Four years 3 13.0%
Five or more years 12 52.2%
14. Does the person find the teaching of the course to be more, less or
equally satisfying than other courses?
More satisfying 8 61.5%
Equally satisfying 4 30.8%
Less satisfying 1 7.7%
No answer 2
15. For what reasons is it more or less satisfying?
A number of respondents failed to answer this question. The other
responses are listed below.
- "I find the students enjoy the course, the material is interesting
and I learn a lot."
- "Because of its mixture of precept and practicality."
- "Small groups, integration of legal knowledge, direct
confrontation of moral issues."
- "The topics are of current and major interest, particularly to
third year students."
- "Small class size, more student involvement and discussion"
- "The students are very interested. They discover a world of
which they were ignorant: the history of the bar and the
problems it faces today."
- "The lack of structure and doctrine and small class format offer
an atmosphere conducive to discussion and exploration."
- "Good discussion of important issues."
- "People not interested - reputation as a 'bird course'."
- "Enthusiastic student response, students more stimulated in
discussion, different teaching methods provide variety of
experience not found in other more traditional courses."




17. To what extent do members of the local practicing bar participate
in the teaching of the course?
- "Occasionally as guests"
- "Aucun" (none)
466 The Dalhousie Law Journal
- "Both teachers are practitioners"
- "Frequent participation"
- "As lecturers from time to time"
- "33%"
- "Not at all"
-"5 different practitioners in 5 different seminars"
- "Benchers and others come to 2 or 3 classes"
- "Local practitioners assist in the orientation of clinical law
students and participate in the program; they seldom participate
in the teaching of Legal Professions course."
- "There are at least three panels of 3-4 practitioners each.
Different lawyers each year."
- "Extensively; have comprised majority of teachers since course
implemented"
- "A member of the bar eventually assumed the leadership role."
- "Extensively"
18. Ought the course in this subject area be a required course in the law
school curriculum? Why or why not?
Yes - 12 70.6%
- "I think many students would like to take it, but after excercising
an election of courses they find they have 'run out of options'."
- "All students, whether barristers or notaries, should take the
course"
- "Because of its practical application to day-to-day situations"
- "If adequate resources committed, it should be required as it is
central to what a lawyer is about"
- "Because of its obvious importance"
- "It should be offered intensively in law, as part of legal writing
and research and therefore deliberately be made to pervade all
law teaching in upper years: because the ethical-fiduciary
component is critical to the role of the legally trained person"
- "Exposure to basic perspectives on the questions 'What kind of
lawyer do I want to be?' 'What does lawyering do for clients/
society?' and so forth is surely as important as taking contracts."
- "Too little at present on obligations, ethics, and pitfalls of
practice."
No - 5 29.4%
- "As long as further options or variations are available, the course
should remain optional"
- "Trop charge" (too emotionally charged)
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- "Our policy is to require courses in only those subjects required
by the Law Society of Upper Canada, although my personal
view is Yes!"
- "The Legal Profession course is designed for students who wish
to study issues of professional responsibility and ethics in an in-
depth fashion" (U. Vic.)
- "Should be taught in all courses."
19. Ought the course to be required by provincial bar societies?
Yes- 11 78.6%
- "Because they can stress what they consider of prime import"
- "Lawyers should know about what they will meet and the
responsibilities flowing from them"
- "I speak as an old Bencher!"
- "Same as number 18"
- "Again"
- "Offered for the past 2 years (I think) as part of the Bar
Admission course offered by the Law Society of Upper
Canada"
- "It is required in Manitoba but not taught with any depth due
to the mandatory law school course. Articling is a socialization
process. Students should be taught to think critically of the
process before they get into it."
No - 3 21.4%
- "Because the provincial law societies should not impose on the
content of university education"
- one is indecipherable
20. What advantages and disadvantages do you see in what presently
constitutes the content of the course?
- "Enables students to study issues in depth" (U. Vic.)
- "I would like to spend more time on the history, sociology and
governance of the profession and the ethics and ideology of legal
service generally. However, within the time allotted it is hard to
do justice to both legal ethics and legal profession. These could
be two courses."
- "The course is not taken seriously by students in the course
selection process (it is optional).and is seen as a 'bird' course;
evaluation made by students following completion of the
course, however, indicates satisfaction and gratitude for the
opportunity to reflect on aspects of the lawyers' role not
provided elsewhere in law school."
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- "The emphasis on C.B.A. Code of Conduct."
- "Dearth of Canadian materials."
- "Insufficient time to examine important topics of the history and
function of the profession in general."
"Subject matter intrinsically interesting; material topical and
timely."
- "Advantage - course covers practical advice on what to do in
everyday matters of practice. Disadvantage - There never
seems to be enough time to cover even a majority of situations
which deserve in-depth discussion, both professional and class."
- "After 3 years we are getting quite a few 'bugs' out of the course.
I plan to revise most of my lectures this eyar and change some
of the material."
"Major disadvantage - no casebook as yet (one in planning
stages)"
- "So little writing in the area - hard to make it relevant."
21. What advantages and disadvantages do you see in the way the
course is presently being taught?
- "Taught by different teaching methods, less structured than
traditional courses."
- "Advantage - enrollment limited to 25 per section, thus greater
student involvement"
- "The methodology of presentation (a mixture of lecture/
socratic/problem discussion) is quite adaptable to the
material."
- "Disadvantage - no Canadian materials - problems must be
devised - no current textbook - cannot be taught to large
groups without more resources."
- "Instructor tends to be preachy; difficult to stimulate class
discussion since students are expected to 'turn on' on arrival at
classroom door; most good discussion and hard thought arises
incidentally from discussions on unrelated topics. The short
time available does not permit structuring class to permit these
to arise."
- "The seminar format is ideal for the purposes of exploring these
topics."
- "Because evaluation is done solely by a paper, about 50% skip
classes."
- "Lots of input from members of Bar."
- "The emphasis on the C.B.A. Code of Conduct does not compel
students to examine in a deeper way the questions of ethics in a
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pure sense and then apply these principles to the practices and
traditions of the legal profession."
- "I would like to see the course taught in a team teaching format
between a full-time member of faculty and perhaps a member of
another discipline, such as philosophy or ethics."
22. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the present
organization and teaching method?
- "More concrete cases drawn from real life."
- "Few changes, save for more time."
- "Talk 'at' law students; assure that consideration of ethical
questions permeates the whole of the law school curriculum
and related activities."
- "Greater coordination between Professional Responsibility
(third and second year) and Judicial Process (first year) in
terms of subject matter."
- "I would insist on the history of the Notariat and use the socratic
method."
- "The material could be improved. We use some 'downtown'
lawyers and judges to increase diversity of views. We are
gradually developing a group of these we know are good."
23. To what extent, if any, is there an expectation of your provincial bar
society that:
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24(a). Is there a faculty mandate or directive at your school that issues of




(b). Is there a faculty mandate or directive that it form a "pervasive"
part of any one course or group of courses at your school?
Yes 7 38.9%
- Clinical (4), Legal Process, Criminal Law, Trial Advocacy, Civil
Procedure, Evidence, Legal Skills, Realty Transaction, Solicitors
Practice
No 11 61.1%
25. If there is such a mandate or directive, do you think it has been
successful?
Yes 1
No 5
